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OPERATIONALIZING FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED
CONSENT
Carla F. Fredericks*
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(“UNDRIP”) has acknowledged varying methods in which
international actors can protect, respect, and remedy the rights of
indigenous peoples.1 One of these methods is the concept of free,
prior, and informed consent (“FPIC”) as described in Articles 10, 19,
28 and 29 of the UNDRIP.2 As this article discusses, there has been
much debate in the international community over the legal status of
the UNDRIP, and member states have done little to implement it.
In applied contexts, many entities such as extractive industries and
conservation groups are aware of risks inherent in not soliciting
FPIC and have endeavored to create their own FPIC protocols when
interacting with indigenous peoples. At present, though, there is an
absence of FPIC protocol that has been developed by indigenous
peoples themselves. A tribal FPIC law and protocol may serve as a
starting point and model to implement a portion of the UNDRIP
and actualize these rights for the development or use of culture,
lands, territories, and resources.
This article contends that
indigenous peoples must develop and implement their own FPIC
protocol in order to assert their human rights, and offers a model
* Director, American Indian Law Program; Associate Clinical Professor and Director,
American Indian Law Clinic, University of Colorado Law School. I would like to express deep
gratitude to my research assistants, Michael Holditch and Kathleen Finn, as well as thank
Kristen Carpenter, S. James Anaya, Sarah Krakoff, Charles Wilkinson, Fred Bloom,
Christina Warner, Jesse Heibel, and Rich Bienstock for helpful comments, and Chairman
David Archambault III, Jodi Gillette, Dean Depountis, Martin Wagner, Jan Hasselman, the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the Spokane Tribe of Indians, Jason Campbell, Chairwoman
Carol Evans, Tom Fredericks, the Coalition of Large Tribes, United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Cathal Doyle, Robert
Coulter, Elsa Stamatopoulou, Rebecca Adamson, and Nick Pelosi for the opportunity to
experience the complexities of this topic firsthand. Any errors are mine alone.
1 See G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13,
2007).
2 See id., arts. 10, 19, 28, 29.
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under United States law for Indian tribes to assert their sovereign
and human rights without waiting for member state
implementation.
II. FPIC AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
FPIC is an evolving international rights standard for entities that
interact with indigenous peoples.3 Closely tied to the concepts of
tribal sovereignty and self-determination, FPIC requires any entity
engaged with a tribe in a manner that impacts tribal resources to
first receive a tribe’s free, prior, and informed consent.4 FPIC is
designed to replace the historical processes that excluded tribes
from decision-making related to activities that took place on or near
their land.5 FPIC is an international rights-based standard,
codified in the UNDRIP, for interactions with indigenous peoples.6
Closely tied to the concepts of tribal sovereignty and selfdetermination, FPIC requires any entity engaged with a tribe in a
manner that impacts tribal resources to first receive a tribe’s free,
prior, and informed consent.7 FPIC is designed to replace the
historical processes that excluded tribes from decision-making
regarding activities that took place on or near their land.8 FPIC has
generally been applied in the context of lands and resources, but
may be appropriate in other settings.9
A. Evolution of FPIC
A formal concept of FPIC for indigenous peoples began to emerge
in the mid-1980s as a critical means to link to, and articulate the
need for, self-determination for indigenous peoples.10 At the time,
most of the conversation around FPIC concerned geographic

3 See James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), Extractive
Industries and Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/41 (July 1, 2013) [hereinafter
Anaya, Extractive Industries].
4 See id. ¶¶ 28, 29.
5 See UN-REDD Programme, Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent 11, 18 (Jan.
2013), http://www.uncclearn.org/sites/default/files/inventory/un-redd05.pdf [hereinafter UNREDD Guidelines].
6 See id. at 14.
7 See Anaya, Extractive Industries, supra note 3, ¶ 27.
8 See UN-REDD Guidelines, supra note 5, at 18.
9 See Anaya, Extractive Industries, supra note 3, ¶¶ 1, 27.
10 See Philippe Hanna & Frank Vanclay, Human Rights, Indigenous Peoples and the
Concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent, 31 IMPACT ASSESSMENT & PROJECT APPRAISAL
146, 150 (2013).
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displacement of indigenous peoples.11 Indeed, in the context of
displacement, there was an “international acceptance of the idea
that displacement of people should not go ahead if the potentially
affected communities found it unacceptable.”12 In light of these
concerns, when displacement was to occur, the displacing body
would attempt to make displacement attractive such that it would
be voluntary.13 This practice created a norm, whereby the use of
force and involuntary action were considered undesirable according
to international consensus.14
The idea of “meaningful consultation” as a part of acquiescence or
consent of indigenous peoples grew out of the World Bank Group in
the 1980s.15
In response to a call from indigenous peoples
worldwide to have a convention or recognition of their rights from
the United Nations, in September of 1984, the Working Group on
Indigenous Peoples (“WGIP”) adopted the “Declaration of
[P]rinciples [A]dopted at the Fourth General Assembly of the World
Council of Indigenous Peoples in Panama.”16 These principles
explicitly mention “free” and “informed” consent in three of the
principles. First, Principle 9 reads: “Indigenous people shall have
exclusive rights to their traditional lands and its resources; where
the lands and resources of the indigenous peoples have been taken
away without their free and informed consent such lands and
resources should be returned.”17 Principle 12 reads: “No action or
course of conduct may be undertaken which, directly or indirectly,
may result in the destruction of land, air, water, sea ice, wildlife,
See id.
Robert Goodland, Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank Group, 4
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 66, 66 (2004) [hereinafter Goodland, Free, Prior and Informed
Consent].
13 See id.
14 See Robert Goodland, The Institutionalized Use of Force in Economic Development: With
Special Reference to the World Bank, in SUSTAINING LIFE ON EARTH: ENVIRONMENTAL AND
HUMAN HEALTH THROUGH GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 339, 344 (Colin L. Soskolne ed., 2008)
[hereinafter Goodland, Institutionalized Use of Force]; see also Goodland, Free, Prior and
Informed Consent, supra note 12, at 67 (“Consent has long been a requirement for indigenous
peoples who may potentially be impacted by a development project.”).
15 Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); Goodland, Free,
Prior and Informed Consent, supra note 12, at 66.
16 Erica-Irene A. Daes (Chairman/Rapporteur on Indigenous Populations), Study of the
Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/22,
annex III (Aug. 27, 1985) [hereinafter Daes, Discrimination against Indigenous Populations];
see also Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Contribution of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations to the Genesis and Evolution of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 48, 49–50 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds.,
2009) [hereinafter Daes, Contribution of the Working Group] (listing all seventeen principles).
17 Daes, Contribution of the Working Group, supra note 16, at 50 (emphasis added).
11
12
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habitat or natural resources without the free and informed consent
of the indigenous peoples affected.”18 Finally, Principle 16 expresses
the importance of prior consultation to the consent process: “The
indigenous peoples and their authorities have the right to be
previously consulted and to authorize the realization of all
technological and scientific investigations to be conducted within
their territories and to have full access to the results of the
investigation.”19
Indigenous peoples groups submitted another draft declaration
that mentioned prior and informed consent, but it was not adopted
at the fourth session of the WGIP. This draft, submitted “by the
Indian Law Resource Center, the Four Directions Council, the
National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Service, the National Indian
Youth Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and the
International Indian Treaty Council[,]” was more strongly worded
than the adopted principles.20 Among other things, the draft called
for “free and informed consent” as to the rights to share and use
land.21 The draft also required “prior authorization” as to the rights
to “technical, scientific or social investigations” on indigenous
peoples or lands.22 When negotiating the “[s]ubstantive principles”
for the “Plan of Action of the WGIP,” there were lots of questions
including what type of mechanism should be used to allow
indigenous peoples control over their own “cultural and educational
activities[.]”23
Importantly, the concept of ethnodevelopment is related to FPIC
and emerged about the same time as FPIC.24 Former U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Dr. Rodolfo
Stavenhagen, developed this concept in 1985.25 Ethnodevelopment
is essentially explicitly including ethnicity and racial differences in
the political process, as well as the development process.26
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
20 See id. at 51.
21 See id.
22 Id. at 52.
23 See Daes, Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, supra note 16, at 56, 57.
24 See Hanna & Vanclay, supra note 10, at 150.
25 See id.
Stavenhagen was the first U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of the
human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples. See Office of the High
Commissioner, U.N. Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
Introduction, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/SRIndigenousPeoples/Pages/SRIPeo
plesIndex.aspx (last visited Dec. 16, 2016). His term was from 2001–2008. Id.
26 See,
e.g., Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Ethnodevelopment: A Neglected Dimension in
Development Thinking (1986), reprinted in 2 SPRINGERBRIEFS ON PIONEERS IN SCIENCE AND
PRACTICE 65, 65 (Hans Günter Brauch ed., 2013).
18
19
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Communities should be able to define how their resources are used
in ways that align with their cultural context, in juxtaposition to
Western notions of development.27 Stavenhagen wrote: “I submit
that ethnodevelopment[,] that is, the development of ethnic groups
within the framework of the larger society, may become a major
issue in development thinking, both theoretically and practically.”28
The nexus between ethnodevelopment and FPIC is rooted in the
need for indigenous peoples to have a mechanism with which to
negotiate during development of their lands, territories, and
resources. FPIC is therefore a means for an ethnically defined class
of people (i.e., indigenous peoples) to negotiate and participate on
their own terms, as a collective.29
In 1989, the concept evolved further in International Labour
Convention No. 169 (“ILO 169”), with its incorporation of “free and
informed consent” in its principles and with ratification by member
states; ILO 169 Articles 6 and 7 together complete the concept.30
Scholars and indigenous peoples relied on existing human rights
principles regarding equal rights and self-determination when later
elaborating the concept of FPIC in the UNDRIP.31
There has been much debate in the international community over
the legal status of the UNDRIP.32 However, the key distinction
establishing the UNDRIP’s non-binding legal character is that
between soft law and hard law:
[W]hether we like it or not, the distinction between hard law
and soft law is a well-established one in modern
international human rights law. This distinction draws on
the basics of general international law, where the list of
legally-binding sources is limited to treaties ratified by
states, customary international law and general principles of
law. Despite the specificities of the international human
See Hanna & Vanclay, supra note 10, at 150.
Stavenhagen, supra note 26, at 84.
29 See Hanna & Vanclay, supra note 10, at 150.
30 Id; see, e.g., Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169,
arts. 6, 7 (June 27, 1989) [hereinafter ILO 169].
31 See, e.g., Hanna & Vanclay, supra note 10, at 150. There is a timeline of the codification
of non-indigenous FPIC requirements: the UNFAO Code of Conduct was amended in 1989 to
include mandatory consent; the 1989 Basel Convention on hazardous wastes includes FPIC;
the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants includes FPIC; and the
2002 Convention on Biological Diversity also includes FPIC. See Goodland, Free, Prior and
Informed Consent, supra note 12, at 67.
32 See Luis Rodríguez-Piñero Royo, “Where Appropriate”: Monitoring/Implementing of
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights under the Declaration, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE
UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 16, at
314, 315, 316, 317.
27
28
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rights regime, it is nonetheless clear that the difference
between an international treaty or convention and a
declaration is still fully understood and applied by states,
international organizations and other relevant operators.33
While this hard law/soft law distinction clarifies the non-binding
legal status of the UNDRIP, this status does not, on a practical
level, divest the UNDRIP of legal authority entirely.34
The
UNDRIP may itself be a “non-binding” document, but using the
UNDRIP to sway domestic disposition is possible with domestic
implementation.35
The UNDRIP can function as an embodiment of international
“principles of self-determination and cultural integrity” that
collectively “uphold the right of indigenous peoples to maintain and
develop their own customary law systems of self-governance.”36 The
most recent former U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, Professor James Anaya, points specifically to
Article 33 of the draft of the UNDRIP, which states: “Indigenous
peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their
institutional structures and their distinctive juridical customs,
traditions, procedures and practices, in accordance with
Id. at 317.
See, e.g., Carla F. Fredericks, Plenary Energy, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 789, 829 (2015) (“[T]he
declaration has no influence from a purely legal standpoint. However, [indigenous groups] . .
. can still utilize UNDRIP as political capital to protect their rights.”).
35 See id. at 827, 828–29, 834 (discussing how the UNDRIP is an appropriate rights-based
framework for approving tribal energy projects); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal
Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 116–17, 119 (2012) (exploring consent theory as applied to
United States federal Indian law); cf. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,250
(Nov. 6, 2000) (“Each agency shall have an accountable process to ensure meaningful and
timely input by tribal officials in the development of regulatory policies that have tribal
implications. Within 30 days after the effective date of this order, the head of each agency
shall designate an official with principal responsibility for the agency’s implementation of this
order. Within 60 days of the effective date of this order, the designated official shall submit to
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) a description of the agency’s consultation
process.”).
36 S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move toward
the Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13, 49, 50 (2004) [hereinafter Anaya,
International Human Rights]; see also G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), annex, art. 1, International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1966) (“All peoples have the right
of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
annex, art. 1, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966) (providing
the same language as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
Anaya cites to the latter two documents to exemplify his statement that “common article 1 of
the international human rights covenants states” the following: “All peoples have the right of
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.” Anaya, International Human
Rights, supra, at 49–50; see G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 1, art. 34.
33
34
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internationally recognised [sic] human rights standards.”37
According to Anaya, included in these “internationally recognised
[sic] human rights” are rights that comport with indigenous
conceptions of ownership that have proven to be problematic
sources of dissonance between Western culture and native
communities throughout the course of history.38 Anaya looks
specifically to ILO 169—providing for recognition of indigenous land
tenure systems—in asserting that this convention “affirms the
notion, promoted by various international institutions, that
indigenous peoples, as groups, are entitled to a continuing
relationship with lands and natural resources according to
traditional patterns of use or occupancy.”39 Of course, land tenure
itself would ensure that attendant rights regarding consent would
be most fully protected.40
Indeed, so-called “soft law” may be one of the most effective
means of promoting indigenous rights through an international law
framework. Although the UNDRIP was adopted through a General
Assembly Resolution,41 its status as soft law does not divest it of
legal authority.42 Due to the intricate and dynamic processes that
shape international law, international standards may evolve from
all of the instruments in place, including those that are categorized

37 Anaya, International Human Rights, supra note 36, at 51.
Anaya’s article was
published in 2004 when the UNDRIP was still a proposed draft. Article 34 of the resulting
UNDRIP states essentially the same as the draft: “Indigenous peoples have the right to
promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs,
spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical
systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards.” G.A. Res.
61/295, supra note 1, art. 34.
38 See Anaya, International Human Rights, supra note 36, at 37, 51; see generally Kristen
A. Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 Yale L.J. 1022, 1028–29 (2009) (proposing a
model of ownership that shifts away from individual-based property law rights and into a
stewardship model that more aptly protects tribal interests in obtaining and enforcing
property rights as a means of protecting cultural heritage).
39 Anaya, International Human Rights, supra note 36, at 40.
Article 14(1) of the
convention states: “The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the
lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized [sic].” ILO 169, supra note 30, art.
14(1). Anaya points out the significance of the present tense in the word “occupy” but also
notes that the convention, via Article 13, allows for a constructive present “occupancy” to be
established by showing a cultural connection to the land. See Anaya, International Human
Rights, supra note 36, at 40.
40 The Dakota Access matter, discussed later, also highlights the need for land tenure to be
considered within the context of treaty rights, even if the treaties have subsequently been
abrogated by the State.
41 See Mauro Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 957,
959 (2009).
42 See id. (“[S]oft law cannot be simply dismissed as non-law.”).
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as binding or non-binding.43 In addition, there are many categories
of soft law that do have governing weight, including “inter-State
conference declarations, U.N. General Assembly resolutions, codes
of conduct, guidelines and the recommendations of international
organizations.”44 The array of international law and standards will
necessarily include all instruments, particularly where normative
aspects give the instrument its moral force.45 This is particularly
true in the human rights context where, like in the UNDRIP, the
content of the rights-cases framework is so important that it
challenges state sovereignty in order to ensure that the rights at
stake are protected.46 Even then, in the context of the UNDRIP and
its protections that safeguard the relationship indigenous peoples
have to their lands, there are complementary international binding
agreements that encompass the same types of obligations.47
Accordingly, where the norms that emerge from the UNDRIP
intersect with binding international law, the UNDRIP serves to give
those instruments moral force, and the instruments conversely
bring the norms set forth in the UNDRIP into a more legally
recognizable status.48
Even considering the rising legal influence of international soft
law, it remains that domestic legal systems have “always been” the
“primary means of enforcement of international law.”49
The
UNDRIP can therefore still carry legal significance as it comports
with treaties and international customary law. Walter Echo-Hawk
43 See id. (“[U]nder the complexity and dynamism of contemporary international lawmaking, international standards may well emerge as a result of the interplay of different
instruments, regardless of their nature.”).
44 Id. at 960.
45 See id.
46 See id. at 962.
47 See id. at 972, 973.
48 See id. at 959.
49 Walter Echo-Hawk, The Human-Rights Era of Federal Indian Law: The Next Forty
Years, 62-APR FED. LAW. 32, 37 (2015); see also Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of
Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 57, 125−26 (1999) (“Beyond international law’s own structures of enforcement,
domestic legal systems should be looked at as the main engines of enforcing international
law. In most domestic legal systems, the authoritative and controlling prescriptions of
international law have been incorporated as standards of domestic legal systems, invited into
the categorically different normative system of internal law through, usually, prescriptions of
the highest rank, such as a constitutive document. In the United States, treaties, at least
those of the ‘self-executing’ kind, form part of the ‘supreme Law of the Land’ as defined by the
United States Constitution. Customary international law is seen as a standard of federal
common law to be used by the courts either on the same level of normative strength as acts of
Congress, or on a level just below. Courts in the United States, as well as in other domestic
systems, therefore, remain important battlegrounds for the enforcement of international
indigenous rights.”).
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aptly describes the UNDRIP’s effect on United States law as a tool
in the dynamic process of augmenting the legal effect of
international human rights law, despite being a non-binding
instrument in itself:
[A]t the present moment the declaration is an authoritative
statement of indigenous rights in the United States, with
standards that build upon the U.N. treaty obligation of the
United States to advance human rights under the U.N.
charter. In addition, the declaration carries immediate
power in five important respects: (1) it can be used by tribal
litigants in carefully crafted test cases to influence courts in
pending cases as persuasive authority when interpreting or
reinterpreting federal Indian law doctrines and judge-made
law; (2) it can guide and influence lawmakers and policymakers when making new Indian laws and policies; (3) the
widely approved international standards are a barometer for
measuring U.S. conduct, laws, and practices and for judging
that conduct in the court of world opinion and international
forums; (4) the U.N. standards can guide Indian country in
setting the agenda for social and legal reform in the 21st
century; and (5) as mentioned above, courts can enforce
those provisions that constitute customary international law
norms or existing treaty obligations of the United States.50
Further, tribal legal systems, through tribal attorneys, are a
critical means for moving the content of the UNDRIP into a binding
domestic law framework.51 Echo-Hawk further posits tribal legal
advocates should consider alternative means and development of
the international norms to best serve the needs of tribal clients:
Legal advocates continually search for the best forums, the
best facts and legal theories, and the best strategies for
meeting their clients’ needs.
Sometimes this search
entails changing the law and finding new and better forums
for presenting claims. This is a proactive process called
strategic law development. It can be done on a discrete
issue-by-issue or client-by-client scale, or it can be done on a
larger, grander scale by advocates when systematic legal
problems are at stake.52

50
51
52

Echo-Hawk, supra note 49, at 37–38.
See id. at 38.
Id.

429 FREDERICKS PRODUCTION (DO NOT DELETE)

438

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 80.2

Indeed, the UNDRIP has influence that may prove quite
significant as the dynamic processes of international and domestic
human rights law-making continue to unfold.53
The right to FPIC and the modern conception of FPIC as written
in the UNDRIP are generally considered to be grounded in the
rights to self-determination, culture, and use of indigenous peoples’
traditional lands, territories, and resources.54 The implementation
of free, prior, and informed consent would allow fundamental and
internationally accepted standards for how governing states should
carry out their responsibilities over indigenous communities as to
resource extraction to prevail.55 As to natural resource development
on indigenous lands, Article 32 of the UNDRIP states: “Indigenous
peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and
strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories
and other resources.”56 It confers upon governing states the
responsibility to “provide effective mechanisms for just and fair
redress” to a tribe when the governing state itself approves of
projects that would affect indigenous lands or natural resources.57
Because of its grounding in indigenous self-determination, FPIC
requires any entity engaged with indigenous peoples in a manner
that impacts their lands and resources to first receive their free,
prior, and informed consent.58 FPIC is designed to replace the
historical processes that excluded indigenous peoples from decisionmaking regarding activities that took place on or near their lands.59
Free, prior, and informed consent appears at multiple points in
the UNDRIP.60 Perhaps most notable are Articles 19 and 32.
Article 19 of UNDRIP requires states to “consult and cooperate in
good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own
53 See Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative
Moment in Human Rights, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 173, 215 (2014) (describing the “jurisgenesis” of
international indigenous rights as a historic and on-going process driven by indigenous
peoples and advocates).
54 See id. at 191.
55 See id. at 191, 206–13 (2014) (describing several examples of international human rights
standards contributing to the development of a jurisprudential paradigm favorable to
indigenous rights, even in the domestic sphere); see also Anaya, International Human Rights,
supra note 36, at 14 (“Numerous processes within the international system have focused on
the common set of ongoing problems that are central to the demands of indigenous groups,
such that there are discernible patterns of response and normative understandings associated
with the rubric of indigenous peoples.
These international processes now reveal a
contemporary body of international human rights law on the subject.”).
56 G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 1, art. 32.
57 Id.
58 See Anaya, Extractive Industries, supra note 3, ¶ 26.
59 See UN-REDD Guidelines, supra note 5, at 18.
60 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 1, arts. 10, 11, 19, 28, 29.
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representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior[,] and
informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or
administrative measures that may affect them.”61 Article 32
requires that states obtain “free and informed consent prior to the
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other
resources, particularly in connection with the development,
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.”62
Two forms of self-determination are reflected in FPIC in the
UNDRIP: autonomous governance and participatory rights.63
According to Anaya, “[t]he affirmation of these dual aspects reflects
the widely-shared understanding that indigenous peoples are not to
be considered unconnected from larger social and political
structures.”64 Anaya argues that the rights in the UNDRIP are
“derived from human rights principles of equality and selfdetermination” that are universally applied.65
B. Defining FPIC
In a legal sense, FPIC is currently only applied to indigenous
peoples and other “traditional peoples.”66 The argument to expand
the application of FPIC to other communities has been advanced by
some scholars.67 In the context of development, FPIC can function
as a signal to interested parties that “indigenous peoples have
rights and interests that will be protected in the development
process.”68 FPIC appears in a variety of initiatives, “ranging from
the safeguard policies of the multilateral development banks and
international financial institutions; practices of extractive
industries; water and energy development; natural resources
management; access to genetic resources and associated traditional
knowledge and benefit-sharing arrangements; scientific and medical
research; and indigenous cultural heritage.”69 The veto power
Id. art. 19.
Id. art. 32.
63 See, e.g., id. arts. 4, 5, 18, 27, 41.
64 S. James Anaya, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the PostDeclaration Era, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON
THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 16, at 184, 193.
65 Id. at 193.
66 See, e.g., Hanna & Vanclay, supra note 10, at 148.
67 See id.
68 Joji Carino, Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Free, Prior, Informed Consent: Reflections on
Concepts and Practice, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 19, 25 (2005).
69 JENNIFER FRANCO, TRANSNATIONAL INST., RECLAIMING FREE PRIOR AND INFORMED
CONSENT (FPIC) IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL LAND GRABS 3 (2014), https://www.tni.org/
files/download/reclaiming_fpic_0.pdf.
61
62
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embedded in FPIC is a critical means to give “the correlative power
to negotiate on equal terms with the project proponent.”70
FPIC can only be made freely if it is made without mental or
physical coercion, external pressures from interested stakeholders
(government or industry), manipulation, bribery, intimidation, or
externally imposed timelines.71 It is clear that an indigenous group
must be given time to “understand, access, and analyze
information” before giving consent.72
However, there is
disagreement about the stage in the planning and development
process at which consent must be obtained.73 Consent can only be
properly obtained if an indigenous group is adequately informed of
all of the potential harms and impacts of a proposed activity.74 This
means that the indigenous group should have accesses to
information that is “clear, consistent, accurate, constant, and
transparent,” as well as objective and complete.75 This includes
access to information in the local language and in a format that is
culturally appropriate.76 The precise set of actions that constitutes
consent is yet to be determined. This is due to the fact that FPIC is
a relatively new concept that has most often been considered in an
international, rather than a domestic, context.77
It is clear,
however, that consent is predicated on the ability for an indigenous
group to say “no” to a proposed activity, as opposed to mere
consultation.78 One essential question is exactly whose consent
must be obtained. Of course, consideration of all impacted rights
holders and community members must be included in the process in
order for there to be free, prior, and informed consent.79 Another
critical aspect is the inclusion of consent at each phase of an
agreement’s implementation.80
Each element of free, prior, and informed consent has legal
significance. It is important to note that these definitions are still
being developed and are often context-specific. First, consent can
only be made freely if “given voluntarily and absent of ‘coercion,
intimidation or manipulation,’” and the process “is self-directed by
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Goodland, Institutionalized Use of Force, supra note 14, at 344.
See UN-REDD Guidelines, supra note 5, at 18.
Id. at 19.
See, e.g., id. at 24, 25.
See id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 11.
See id. at 20.
See id.
See UN-REDD Guidelines, supra note 5, at 20.

429 FREDERICKS PRODUCTION (DO NOT DELETE)

2016/2017]

Operationalizing Free, Prior, and Informed Consent

441

the community from whom consent is being sought, unencumbered
by coercion, expectations or timelines that are externally imposed
. . . .”81 It is clear that a tribe must be given time to “understand,
access, and analyze information” before giving consent.82 However,
there is disagreement about the stage in the planning and
development process at which consent must be obtained.83
C. Modern Contextualization of FPIC
In the public context, FPIC is seen as a minimum standard for
nations working with indigenous groups.84 FPIC is recognized in
multiple articles of UNDRIP.85 Article 32, for instance, states the
following:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the
indigenous peoples concerned through their own
representative institutions in order to obtain their free and
informed consent prior to the approval of any project
affecting their lands or territories and other resources,
particularly in connection with the development, utilization
or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.86
Although the document is not legally binding, this helps
demonstrate a participating nation’s acceptance of the concept of
FPIC.
In the private context, FPIC is developing into an international
standard for companies operating on indigenous lands.87 Much of
this progress is a result of shareholders concerned about the
financial and reputational risks to which their companies are
exposed when operating on indigenous lands without the consent of
the impacted community.88
For instance, in 2007, 91.6% of
Newmont Mining Corporation’s shareholders passed a resolution
that directed the corporation to assess its practices and policies with
respect to indigenous peoples.89 Newmont, as a founding member of
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
83 See, e.g., id. at 20.
84 See FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES GUIDEBOOK ON FREE PRIOR
INFORMED CONSENT AND CORPORATION STANDARDS 4 (2011), http://www.firstpeoples.org/
images/uploads/IPs%20Guidebook%20to%20FPIC.pdf
[hereinafter
FIRST
PEOPLES
WORLDWIDE, GUIDEBOOK].
85 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 1, arts. 10, 11, 19, 28, 29, 32.
86 Id. art. 32, § 2.
87 See FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 84, at 4.
88 See id.
89 Id. at 3.
81
82
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the International Council on Mining and Metals (“ICMM”), recently
approved an “Indigenous Peoples and Mining” position statement—
created by ICMM—that recognizes FPIC and discusses the
importance of engaging and consulting with indigenous
communities that may be impacted by the corporation’s business
operations.90 The most recent ICMM position statement requires
that indigenous people should be “able to freely make decisions
without coercion, intimidation or manipulation; . . . given sufficient
time to be involved in project decision-making before key decisions
are made and impacts occur; and . . . fully informed about the
project and its potential impacts and benefits.”91
Free, prior, and informed consent is a key aspect in adhering to a
“rights-and-risks” approach to decision-making regarding energy
resource development, for example.92
The “‘rights-and-risks’
approach explicitly combines human rights impact assessments
with risks assessments” in ascertaining the stakeholders for these
decisions.93 Through a proper consent-seeking negotiation with
stakeholders, tribes should be able to develop energy resources
without undue interference from outside entities.
Although the United States and major extractive companies are
moving toward a respect for tribal rights, it will be tribes
themselves that are vested with the unique opportunity to
proactively engage stakeholders with respect to FPIC as a condition
for companies engaging with a tribe.94 A consent regime recognizes
this right and this reality, and considers both best interests and
self-determination.95 Tribes can move toward establishing their
own “consent regime[s,]” shaping the requirement under Montana v.
United States96 that nonmembers must be engaged in a consensual
90 See Strengthening Our Commitment to the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, NEWMONT
MINING CORP. (May 22, 2013), http://ourvoice.newmont.com/2013/05/22/strengthening-ourcommitment-to-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples/.
91 INT’L COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND MINING: POSITION
STATEMENT (2013), http://www.icmm.com/document/5433 [hereinafter ICMM 2013 POSITION
STATEMENT].
92 See Carino, supra note 68, at 21–22; see also WORLD COMM’N ON DAMS, DAMS AND
DEVELOPMENT:
A
NEW
FRAMEWORK
FOR
DECISION-MAKING
219
(2000),
http://www.internationalrivers.org/sites/default/files/attached-files/world_commission_on_
dams_final_report.pdf (discussing the importance of consent in terms of projects and
negotiating conditions or terms).
93 Carino, supra note 68, at 22–23.
94 See generally FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 84, at 4 (indicating
that indigenous peoples can use FPIC in both the public and private sector to advocate for
their rights).
95 See generally Fletcher, supra note 35, at 119 (discussing how consent theory allows
tribes to take control over their lands and rights).
96 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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relationship with a tribe in order to fall under tribal jurisdiction.97
This type of tribal juridical indoctrination can help fortify tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers, helping establish a foundational
legal landscape supporting the implementation of consent theory.
III. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND FPIC
The relevant international case law defines “consent” as “the
canopy for, and is a derivative of, a myriad of human rights, inter
alia the right to self-determination and self-determined
development, the right to property . . . the right to practice
traditional livelihoods, and collective dimensions of rights to health,
food, life, housing, participation and cultural rights.”98
The
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“Commission”) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(“IACHR”) grounds FPIC in property, self-determination, and
culture.99 The IACHR has found that FPIC is derived from rights
“to cultural identity and right to life,” among others, triggering
FPIC at a lower threshold with a narrower set of limitations on
FPIC than solely property rights.100
The most significant case on FPIC with domestic impacts is the
1985 case, United States v. Dann.101 Mary and Carrie Dann,
Shoshone sisters, were attempting to acquire title to their ancestral
lands, which the United States had appropriated into federal
property through Indian Claims Commission procedures.102 After
exhausting domestic remedies, they looked to international
tribunals.103 The Commission issued a report concluding that the
See id. at 565 (citations omitted); Fletcher, supra note 35, at 119.
CATHAL M. DOYLE, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TITLE TO TERRITORY, RIGHTS AND RESOURCES:
THE TRANSFORMATIVE ROLE OF FREE PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT 130 (2015).
99 See Alex Page, Indigenous Peoples’ Free Prior and Informed Consent in the InterAmerican Human Rights System, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 16, 16 (2004); see also
CATHAL DOYLE & JILL CARIÑO, MAKING FREE PRIOR & INFORMED CONSENT A REALITY:
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE EXTRACTIVE SECTOR 8 (2013), http://solutionsnetwork.org/site-fpic/files/2012/09/Making-Free-Prior-Informed-Consent-a-RealityDoyleCarino.pdf (“In 2003, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, described FPIC as embodying ‘the right to say
no,’ and being of ‘crucial concern’ and ‘essential for the human rights of indigenous peoples in
relation to major development projects.’ The current Special Rapporteur on the rights of
indigenous peoples has argued that we are witnessing the development of an international
norm requiring the consent of indigenous peoples when their property rights are impacted by
natural resource extraction.”).
100 See DOYLE, supra note 98, at 130.
101 United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 43 (1985).
102 Id.
103 See Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc 5 rev. ¶ 1 (2002).
97
98
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United States failed to ensure the Danns’ right to property contrary
to Articles 2, 17, and 23 of the American Declaration on Rights and
Duties of Man.104 In part, the court found that a determination as
to indigenous peoples’ land rights must be based on the consent of
the whole community, who must be fully informed.105 The court
found that this did not occur in the Dann case.106 This case
illustrates the difficulty of operationalizing FPIC even in countries
with a strong rule of law (in contrast to developing countries).107
Significantly, the way the United States government handled the
land negotiations amounted to a violation of human rights.108 The
case illustrates that FPIC is in part grounded in the inquiry about
who can rightfully give “consent.”109 The procedural intricacies of
the case also indicate that international tribunals should better
develop their own understandings about whether a group of
individuals has authority to speak for a whole community.110
In 2001, the Commission considered the collective rights and the
nature of securing consent in Awas Tingni Community v.
Nicaragua.111 In that case, Nicaragua granted a Korean corporation
licenses to cut trees on indigenous community lands, which the
Nicaraguan government had never demarcated as indigenous
lands.112 The Awas Tingni community found out about logging
when loggers were moving onto their territory, after Nicaraguan
government gave permission.113 Nicaragua failed to compensate the
indigenous peoples for their losses and the Awas Tingni community
filed a petition with the Commission in 1995.114 The IACHR found
that Nicaragua violated Articles 1, 2, 21 and 25 of the American
Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”) and ordered Nicaragua to
create a mechanism to demarcate indigenous lands.115 However,
the legal protections in place were not practiced in reality. The
See id. ¶ 5.
See Page, supra note 99, at 18.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See id.
109 See id.
110 See id.
111 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).
112 See Claudio Grossman, Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A Landmark Case for the InterAmerican System, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1, 1 (2001).
113 See Page, supra note 99, at 16.
114 See id. at 16, 20 n.6.
115 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community
v. Nicaragua, 7 AUSTL. INDIGENOUS L. REP. 37, 38 (2002); see also Awas Tingni Community,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 173 (providing the outcome of the case).
104
105
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IACHR found that Nicaragua had violated the community’s right to
property by issuing permissions without consent of the
community,116 based on Article 21 of the ACHR.117 The court also
found that lands, territories, and resources were particularly
important to indigenous peoples to preserve spiritual and cultural
heritage.118 Self-determination played a central role in the decision
because the decision mandated that Nicaragua could only proceed
with the participation of the Awas Tingni community.119
In 2004, the Commission relied on Dann in Maya Indigenous
Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize,120 finding that land
rights decisions cannot be made “without the free and informed
There, the Belizean
consent of the peoples concerned.”121
government granted concessions to logging and extractive
companies because the Maya lands were considered “national
lands.”122 The Commission recommended that the state provide the
Maya peoples with an effective remedy including recognizing title to
lands they have traditionally used and occupied in accordance with
customary land use practices.123 Importantly, the Commission did
not specifically rely on FPIC as binding international law, but
located the rights of indigenous peoples in property and spiritual
and cultural connection to those lands.124 Since 2004, this case has
moved through various tribunals to enforce the Maya land claims.125
In 2007 case, the Commission in Saramaka People v. Suriname,126
found that Suriname had a duty under Article 21 of the ACHR to
obtain FPIC prior to granting concessions for the exploration and
extraction of natural resources.127 The IACHR held that the FPIC
obligation required FPIC be obtained in accordance with the
Saramaka peoples’ customs and traditions and with recognition of

116 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community
v. Nicaragua, supra note 115, at 38, 40–41; Page, supra note 99, at 16.
117 See Page, supra note 99, at 16.
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.122, doc 5 rev. ¶ 1 (2004).
121 Page, supra note 99, at 19.
122 See id. at 18.
123 Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District, supra note 120, ¶ 6.
124 Page, supra note 99, at 19.
125 See, e.g., Belize: Advocating Maya People’s Rights to Land, MINORITY RTS. GROUP (Nov.
22, 2016), http://minorityrights.org/law-and-legal-cases/maya-in-belize/.
126 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007).
127 See id. ¶ H5.

429 FREDERICKS PRODUCTION (DO NOT DELETE)

446

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 80.2

the Saramaka peoples’ communal property rights.128 The IACHR
“held that the right to give or withhold consent is premised on the
nature of the impact to indigenous peoples’ self-determinationinformed right to property over their lands, territories and natural
resources.”129 Additionally, the court linked the requirement for
FPIC to the land, as well as cultural and physical survival.130 This
case affirmed the right of indigenous peoples to give or withhold
FPIC, which then makes FPIC more appropriately conceived of as a
“right” because it flows from and is necessary for the realization of
the right of self-determination, per Dr. Cathal Doyle.131 This case
also clarifies that indigenous peoples should determine who gives
consent according to their own traditions and customs.132
Recently, in 2012, the IACHR held in Kichwa Indigenous People
of Sarayaku v. Ecuador,133 that Ecuador was liable for breaching
the Sarayaku peoples’ right to FPIC in accordance with
international standards by signing contracts with a third party for
the exploration of hydrocarbons and crude oil in the Sarayaku
territories, sixty-five percent of which they legally owned.134 The
third party contracts were signed in 1996; Ecuador signed ILO 169
in 1998 and the court relied heavily on Ecuador’s obligations under
ILO 169 in its opinion that FPIC is required and is based on
indigenous peoples’ rights to life, culture, and communal
property.135 The IACHR affirmed that the right to consultation
with the “objective of consent, is derived from the right to cultural
integrity.”136 The ruling also affirmed that consent should be the
“objective” of consultations, though the court did not speak as to
making it a requirement.137 This case is “considered an important
See id. ¶¶ H3, H5.
DOYLE, supra note 98, at 129.
130 See id.; see also David Szablowski, Operationalizing Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
in the Extractive Industry Sector? Examining the Challenges of a Negotiated Model of Justice,
30 CANADIAN J. DEV. STUD. 111, 115 (2010) (describing how development decisions need to
consider the survival of indigenous tribes).
131 See DOYLE, supra note 98, at 132.
132 See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185, ¶¶ 18, 22 (Aug. 12, 2008); DOYLE &
CARIÑO, supra note 99, at 12.
133 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 (June 27, 2012).
134 See id. ¶¶ 63–65, 127, 186–87, 341.
135 See id. ¶¶ 64, 70, 179–81; see also Dani Bryant, Sarayaku v. Ecuador: Lessons in Free,
Prior and Informed Consultation, FASKEN MARTINEAU (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.fasken
.com/sarayaku-v-ecuador-lessons-in-free-prior-and-informed-consultation/ (describing the
obligation under ILO 169).
136 DOYLE, supra note 98, at 129.
137 See id.
128
129
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legal precedent[,] as it establishes a legal meaning on how and
when FPIC should be applied.”138
IV. TRIBAL FPIC
The precedents of the Commission and the proliferation of
international norms has resulted in many companies beginning to
explore FPIC rules regarding indigenous interactions, and lay out
processes to obtain a tribe’s free, prior, and informed consent. But
ultimately, self-determination is achieved by indigenous
communities establishing their own FPIC rules, enabling them to
take control of their own business interactions.
In the United States, tribes have a unique opportunity to harness
the possibility of FPIC by asserting civil jurisdiction over
individuals acting on its reservation, because of the Supreme
Court’s holding in Montana v. United States, which states that
tribes have civil jurisdiction over “nonmembers who enter [into]
consensual relationships with [a] tribe or its members” and over
nonmembers who threaten or “[have] some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
[a] tribe.”139 Tribes in the U.S. therefore have a unique opportunity
to integrate FPIC into business licenses under a “Law and Order”
code, thereby creating the necessary consensual relationship to
ensure that its FPIC code applies to non-Indian businesses
operating on non-Indian fee land on the reservation under the first
Montana exception. This section describes how a tribe may
integrate an FPIC protocol into its tribal code to ensure its ability to
prosecute offenders in tribal court. The section will close by briefly
discussing considerations that should be made regarding
enforcement of the code.
A. Integrating FPIC as a License to Operate140
Many U.S. tribes already secure jurisdiction over nonmember
businesses through their business licensing codes.141
By
Hanna & Vanclay, supra note 10, at 152.
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 545, 565–66 (1981) (citations omitted).
140 There is also the possibility of integrating an FPIC requirement into a Tribal
Employment Rights Ordinance (“TERO”) process. FPIC can fit either into a business
licensing code or a TERO, which generally serves to ensure fair employment and prevent
discrimination against tribal members in hiring on the reservation. A tribe could still rely on
processes developed in a TERO context when drafting an FPIC code to insure reservationwide compliance with the FPIC code.
141 See, e.g., EASTERN BAND CHEROKEE INDIANS CODE § 106-20 (2016).
Often a sworn
138
139
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incorporating FPIC into the already existing business licensing
code, a tribe will be able to ensure that non-Indian businesses
operating on the reservation first obtain FPIC.
To integrate an FPIC requirement into the business licensing
process, a tribe would require the licensee to comply with FPIC
either through a tribal law or protocol, or as expressed in the
UNDRIP.142 It would be preferable for a tribe itself to define the
process with which businesses must comply in order to obtain a
tribe’s free, prior, and informed consent and thus meet the business
license condition.143 Under this structure, if a tribe chooses to deny
consent, the business would not be able to obtain a license to
operate on the reservation.144 By requiring consent before granting
a license, a tribe is ensuring that their consent is obtained before
any harmful actions are taken by businesses operating within the
boundaries of the reservation.
B. Implementing an FPIC Code: A Case Study
Working in partnership with an American Indian tribe to develop
the first of its kind FPIC code in the United States, I developed
three options for structuring the potential new FPIC chapter of the
tribal code (“FPIC chapter”), tentatively titled “FPIC code.” These
models differ based on the entity that a tribe would like to designate
as responsible for providing consent. The three possibilities are: a
Tribal Business Council (“Council”); a separate entity within the
tribal government; or the tribal membership.145 This section will
discuss how each of these decision-making models would be
implemented and will evaluate the potential advantages and
disadvantages of each.
1. Tribal Business Council
Under this model, a Tribal Business Council would be solely
responsible for ensuring that businesses comply with the FPIC
chapter in obtaining a tribe’s free, prior, and informed consent. In
order to comply with the FPIC chapter, the company would likely
statement that the business consents to tribal court jurisdiction as part of the business
license application is required. See, e.g., COLO. RIVER TRIBAL CODES § 1-106(6) (2006).
142 See, e.g., COLO. RIVER TRIBAL CODES § 1-106(6) (providing an example of a current
application for business license code and protocols).
143 See, e.g., id.
144 See, e.g., id. § 1-110 (providing an example of a current denial of license or renewal code
provision).
145 See infra Parts IV(B)(1), IV(B)(2), IV(B)(3).
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have to provide any required information to the Tribal Business
Council. The Council would need to set a minimum standard of
information, which may include how the proposed business activity
would impact the reservation’s environment, culture, and economy
both positively and negatively. The Council would then review the
information and have a process in place through which to determine
whether it wants to give consent, thus bringing the company into
compliance with the FPIC chapter and allowing the company to
move forward with the chapter on business licensing process.146
One drawback of this model is that it is time consuming for the
Tribal Business Council to review relevant information and to make
an informed decision regarding each proposed business activity.
The Council may not have the resources to meet these demands and
the process may prove overly burdensome for companies, possibly
resulting in a backlog for the granting of tribal business licenses.
There are a number of ways to address these concerns.
One option is to refrain from binding the Council to the process.
FPIC is currently an emerging norm and seen as an aspirational
goal rather than binding international law.147 A tribe could choose
to develop the FPIC chapter as an aspirational goal rather than a
process with which the Council and companies must comply.
Though this would be less burdensome, it would also greatly reduce
the positive impacts associated with enacting an FPIC code.
Another option is to limit application of the requirement to
particular types of companies. For instance, a tribe could require
that only large-scale, for-profit businesses (to be defined in the FPIC
chapter) must comply with the FPIC chapter. An additional option,
discussed below, is to task a commission within the tribal
government to ensure that businesses are complying with the FPIC
chapter.
2. Separate Tribal Government Entity
Under the FPIC chapter, a tribe could task an entity within the
tribal government to ensure compliance with the FPIC code and to
provide tribal consent. Possible entities include the tribe’s Business
License Commission,148 the tribe’s Tribal Employment Rights
146 See, e.g., REVISED LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE SPOKANE TRIBE OF INDIANS § 31-4.06
(2013) (providing an example of a current code section that describes conditions that must be
met before a license will be granted).
147 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
148 See REVISED LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE SPOKANE TRIBE OF INDIANS §§ 31-3.01, 313.03, 31-3.05.
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Commission Office,149 another preexisting commission within the
tribal government that would be well-suited for the work, or an
FPIC commission to be created under the FPIC chapter. Under this
model, the entity selected, rather than the Tribal Business Council,
would be responsible for evaluating information regarding the
impact of proposed extractive activity and then either deny or
provide consent. This may help alleviate the constraints associated
with the first model.
This model is advantageous because it relies largely on existing
resources and structures. If it were not overly burdensome on the
entity, implementing an FPIC requirement may be as simple as
statutorily empowering the tribe’s Business License Commission or
Tribal Employment Rights Commission Office to assume the duties
listed above. Or, if sufficient resources are available, an FPIC
commission could be established by the same procedure used to
create the Business License Commission and Tribal Employment
Rights Commission Office. Once an entity is chosen, those drafting
the FPIC chapter could use the language and processes already
utilized in the tribal code as models for determining how the FPIC
code will be executed. For instance, a tribe could look to the TERO
processes when creating an FPIC commission (or delegating power
to another tribal entity) and use it to establish the rules,
regulations, and policies governing the Commission’s duty to insure
reservation-wide compliance with the FPIC code. This may include
looking to the language that establishes the TERO commission,
defining the duties and powers of the Commission and its Director,
developing a process for complaints and hearings, and discussing
enforcement and penalties for violations.150
Another option
regarding the placement of the FPIC code would be to expand the
purpose of the TERO code and integrate an FPIC process into the
TERO code.
If the Tribal Business Council is concerned about delegating its
authority to give consent, this model may seem problematic. One
way to alleviate that concern, however, is to require Council
approval of all determinations made by the chosen entity. Another
important factor that a tribe should consider, as discussed below, is
the extent to which it wants to integrate tribal members and
community stakeholders into the process.

149
150

See id. § 45-1.1.
See id. §§ 45-3.0, 45-6.0, 45-7.0.
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3. Tribal Membership
Most discussions of FPIC emphasize the need to engage
individual stakeholders and community members in the consent
process. We understand, however, that there are times that the
Tribal Business Council disagrees with the tribal membership and
vice versa. It is ultimately up to a tribe to determine the role of
tribal members in the consent process.
If a tribe chooses to engage its members in the consent process,
the engagement could take a variety of forms. To ensure that the
membership remains informed, the FPIC chapter could require that
information concerning proposed extractive activity and any
potential impacts is disseminated throughout the community by
radio, newspapers, flyers, and/or during community meetings.
Community hearings could also provide an opportunity for those
members potentially impacted by the activity to voice their
concerns. Another option is to have a “comment and feedback”
period—similar to the process required for Environmental Impact
Statements151—to allow members to express their support of or
opposition to a proposed business activity. If a tribe selects one of
these methods for soliciting comments from tribal members, it must
also determine the weight that will be given to those comments.
Community engagement, which by its nature is an involved and
lengthy process, has the ability to slow or stall business activity on
the reservation. However, it is an important element of FPIC that a
tribe should meaningfully consider. If a tribe is concerned about
delay, it could solicit comments from tribal members regarding
large-scale development projects only. Another option would be to
limit the role of community comment to a persuasive, rather than
determinative, one; thereby leaving the ultimate decision to grant
or deny consent with the Tribal Business Council or appointed
entity.
C. Enforcing an FPIC Code: Defining Violations and Choosing
Sanctions
Under each of the three models discussed above, a tribe must
define the conduct that constitutes a violation of its FPIC code,
which would be prosecutable in tribal court. One offense could be if
151 National Environmental Policy Act Review Process: Environmental Impact Statements
(EIS), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/nepa/national-environmental-policy-actreview-process (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
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a business does not obtain tribal consent “freely.” “Freely” would be
defined in the FPIC chapter and could exclude consent obtained
through fraud, duress, or bribery. Another offense could be if the
business does not “inform” a tribe based on the standards provided
in the FPIC chapter. A tribe must also determine who is eligible to
bring a claim for a violation of the FPIC code in tribal court. That
will depend largely on which implementation model a tribe chooses
to pursue. If the business is found guilty of a violation, it could be
forced to pay a fine, to mitigate any resulting impacts, or to adhere
to any other sanctions developed in the FPIC chapter. A tribe could
also rely on sanctions codified in the business licensing chapter of
the tribal code, which may include revocation of the business
license, fines, and the removal or exclusion of non-Indians from the
reservation.152
V. FEDERAL IMPLICATIONS
Federal law does not prohibit a tribe—assuming that it has civil
jurisdiction over the individuals and land in question—from
conditioning the extraction of its mineral resources on the
procurement of FPIC. The 1981 U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Montana v. United States was a “pathmarking” case for determining
tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.153 In Montana, the Court
found that tribes lack the “inherent sovereign powers” to regulate
activities of nonmembers, even on land that is within reservation
boundaries but not tribally owned, because this power had been
implicitly divested as a result of tribes’ dependent status.154
The Montana Court articulated two exceptions to this general
rule precluding civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.
These
exceptions are first, situations in which nonmembers have entered
into a consensual relationship with a tribe, and second, situations in
which the regulated conduct directly threatens tribal integrity:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on
their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe
152 See generally REVISED LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE SPOKANE TRIBE OF INDIANS § 31-5
(providing a section of a tribal code that is dedicated to codified sanctions).
153 See Fletcher, supra note 35, at 100.
154 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (citations omitted) (establishing
that relations between tribes and nonmembers is one area in which implicit divestiture of
sovereignty has occurred); see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194,
209–10 (1978) (applying the principle of divestiture of inherent sovereign powers over
nonmembers in the criminal context).
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may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means,
the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial
dealing,
contracts,
leases,
or
other
arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on
fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.155
As Professor Sarah Krakoff explains, the Montana opinion left
many questions open on tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers:
Was the Court assuming that exercises of civil jurisdiction
over nonmembers on tribal lands automatically fit within
one of the Montana exceptions? Or was the Court assuming
that the presumption of tribal authority on tribal lands, even
over nonmembers, remained intact? . . . Finally, how would
the Court interpret the second Montana exception? Would it
be necessary for a tribe to argue that absent regulation of the
particular behavior[, a] tribe’s welfare would be imperiled?
Or would tribes be able to contend that certain exercises of
self-government are sufficiently connected to what it means
to be a sovereign that the inability to assert them would
necessarily threaten their political integrity?156
In 1997, in Strate v. A-1 Contractors,157 the U.S. Supreme Court
expounded upon the jurisdictional framework established under
Montana.
This was a personal injury action brought by a
nonmember resident of the Fort Berthold Reservation who was
injured in an automobile accident that took place on a state
highway located both within the reservation boundaries and atop

Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66 (internal citations omitted).
Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil Judicial Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide
for Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1187, 1209 (2010); see also John P. LaVelle, Implicit
Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen’s Handbook Cutting-Room Floor, 38 CONN.
L. REV. 731, 744 (2006) (“Read against the backdrop of previous case law affirming tribal
powers, these two exceptions can be reconciled with the general proposition that tribes retain
broad authority in Indian country over the conduct of Indians and non-Indians alike, limited
only in the rare instance where no significant tribal interest is at stake with respect to the
conduct of nonmembers on reservation lands owned in fee by non-Indians. This contextual
reading of Montana suggests that in most cases tribes’ inherent civil regulatory authority
over non-Indians and nonmember Indians in Indian country should be cognizable under
Montana’s exceptions, which must be construed broadly to comport with longstanding
principles of Indian law.”).
157 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). The author wishes to note that the
nonmember resident in question was the mother of the author’s half siblings.
155
156
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land held in trust for the reservation’s tribes.158 The defendant, also
a nonmember, was a party to a construction contract with the tribes
of the reservation.159 The Court made several significant findings in
this case, including: first, the Montana presumption against civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers applies to both adjudicatory and
regulatory civil jurisdiction, because “a tribe’s adjudicative
jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction[;]”160 second,
despite the trust status of the land underlying the highway, the
highway was the “equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes,
to alienated, non-Indian land” because the federal government had
granted the state and the public a right-of-way over the land to use
the highway, meaning the tribes had “retained no gatekeeping
right[;]”161 and third, this matter did not meet the consensual
relationships exception to the Montana presumption due to the
“non-tribal nature” of the accident and the lack of a sufficient nexus
between the parties and the tribes:
The dispute, as the Court of Appeals said, is “distinctly nontribal in nature.”
It “arose between two non-Indians
involved in [a] run-of-the-mill [highway] accident.” Although
A-1 was engaged in subcontract work on the Fort Berthold
Reservation, and therefore had a “consensual relationship”
with the Tribes, “Gisela Fredericks was not a party to the
subcontract, and the Tribes were strangers to the
accident.”162
Accompanying this analysis of the first Montana exception,
footnote number eleven acknowledges that tribal police have the
power to patrol portions of the highway that are within reservation
boundaries, “including rights-of-way made part of a state highway,
and to detain and turn over to state officers nonmembers stopped on

See id. at 442–43.
See id. at 443.
160 See id. at 453. The Court was contextualizing its statement in Iowa Mutual Insurance
Company v. LaPlante, that “[c]ivil jurisdiction over [the] activities [of non-Indians on
reservation lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts . . . .” Id. at 451 (quoting Iowa Mut.
Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987)). The Court did so in positing that this statement
merely stands for the “unremarkable proposition” that tribes presumptively have jurisdiction
over nonmembers when “tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers . . .
.” Strate, 520 U.S. at 453; see also LaVelle, supra note 156, at 756 (“The effect of the Strate
Court’s unconventional reading of the Iowa Mutual statement was to transform Iowa
Mutual’s presumption favoring tribal court jurisdiction over the activities of nonmembers into
a presumption against such jurisdiction, requiring tribes to justify their assertions of
adjudicative authority over nonmembers under the Court’s Montana test.”).
161 See Strate, 520 U.S. at 454, 455–56.
162 Id. at 457 (quoting A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 940 (8th Cir. 1996)).
158
159
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the highway for conduct violating state law.”163
Some scholars have asserted that the Strate Court’s decision had
the compounding effects of expanding the Montana presumption
while diminishing its exceptions.164 One of these arguments rests
on the viewpoint that the Court’s analogizing of the state highway
to non-Indian fee land is in preservation of the critical nature of the
land status inquiry in determining tribal civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers:
Strate thus appears to have effected a diminishment of both
Montana exceptions while extending Montana’s “general
rule”—i.e., Montana’s presumption against inherent tribal
governing authority over nonmembers—to include (1) tribal
adjudicative jurisdiction as well as legislative jurisdiction
and (2) conduct on state highways as well as non-Indian fee
lands. Strate’s determination that, for purposes of a Montana
analysis, the state highway at issue was sufficiently
analogous to non-Indian fee lands suggested nonetheless
that the status of the land would remain a crucial threshold
consideration.165
Another view presents a spin on the effect of the Strate decision
on what types of claims can meet the consensual relationship
exception under Montana, explaining that “but for” causation (i.e.,
incidents that would not have occurred but for the existence of a
consensual relationship with a tribe) will likely not suffice to meet
the exception:
After Strate, it is safe to assume that only claims arising
directly out of a consensual relationship, such as a breach of
contract, violation of a licensing, royalty, or other agreement,
or perhaps a tort arising from the breach of any such
agreement or arrangement, will suffice. Arguments that,
“but for” a consensual relationship with a tribe or its
Strate, 520 U.S. at 456 n.11.
See LaVelle, supra note 156, at 757–58.
165 Id. at 758–59; see Todd Miller, Comment, Easements on Tribal Sovereignty, 26 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 105, 105–06 (2002) (explaining how the Court’s expansion of the Montana rule
under Strate influenced the Ninth Circuit ruling in Big Horn Country Elec. Coop. v. Adams
(Big Horn Country Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 955 (9th Cir. 2000)), a case in which
the Ninth Circuit held that the Crow Tribe could not impose a utility tax on power lines for
which a private cooperative had obtained an easement, analogizing it to fee simple lands); see
also Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001) (“Indian ownership suspends the ‘general
proposition’ derived from Oliphant that ‘the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do
not extend to the activities of nonmembers of [a] tribe’ except to the extent ‘necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.’” (quoting Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 545, 564–65 (1981))).
163
164
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members, the nonmember would not have engaged in the
activity on the reservation that ultimately gave rise to a
legal claim, are unlikely to succeed.166
The 2001 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Atkinson Trading
Company v. Shirley167 elaborated upon the Strate Court’s ruling on
the first Montana exception. In this case, a non-Indian proprietor of
a hotel located on fee land within reservation boundaries sued to
prevent the Navajo Nation from imposing a tax on the hotel
rooms.168 There, the tribe argued that the hotel fell under the first
Montana exception because the hotel’s guests benefitted from
emergency services provided by the tribe (e.g., police, fire, and
emergency medicine).169 Invoking Strate, the Court rejected this
argument:
[A] nonmember’s actual or potential receipt of tribal police,
fire, and medical services does not create the requisite
connection. If it did, the exception would swallow the rule:
All non-Indian fee lands within a reservation benefit, to
some extent, from the “advantages of a civilized society”
offered by the Indian tribe. . . . Such a result does not square
with our precedents; indeed, we implicitly rejected this
argument in Strate, where we held that the nonmembers had
not consented to [a] Tribes’ adjudicatory authority by
availing themselves of the benefit of tribal police protection
while traveling within the reservation.170
Some scholars have argued that the Atkinson Court was wrong in
its analysis of the first Montana exception, positing that the hotel
had voluntarily submitted to the regulatory regime established
under the applicable “Indian Traders” statutes, thereby creating the
necessary consensual relationship:
The Court failed to properly consider the argument that
Atkinson Trading Post obtained a license from the Navajo
Nation in order to conduct business on the reservation. This
type of “dealing” and “arrangement” meets the consensual
relationship test on its face. By engaging in business within
the borders of the Navajo Nation the petitioner entered into
a “consensual relationship” with [a] tribe via the regulations
Krakoff, supra note 156, at 1215.
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
168 See id. at 648–49.
169 See id. at 654–55.
170 Id. at 655 (first citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137–38 (1982);
then citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456–57 (1997)).
166
167
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incorporated in the “Indian Traders” statutes.
“The
regulations reflect a determination that all non-members
who engage in retail business on the Navajo Reservation,
have a sufficient nexus with [a] tribe and its members” in
order to support the tax. Atkinson Trading Post’s “voluntary
submission to the regulatory regime,” established by the
“Indian Trader” statutes, creates a consensual relationship
with the Navajo Nation, thereby satisfying the first
exception of the Montana test. As a result of the Petitioner
obtaining an “Indian Trader” license, the entire business is
brought within the first exception under the Montana
analysis.171
A remedial measure may be for Congress to enact a tribal
jurisdictional scheme, as “[a]bsent legislative efforts by Congress to
return proper control to the tribes, tribal governments will not be
able to move forward and govern properly.”172
Professor Matthew Fletcher argues that there exists a double
standard of consent between tribal governments asserting authority
over nonmembers and the federal government asserting authority
over tribes:
When the Supreme Court speaks about consent of
nonmembers to tribal governance, the Court robustly
demands that the tribal government produce literal, express
consent by nonmembers to tribal authority.
This
requirement stands in great contrast to the implied, often
illusory, consent that the Court finds important in the
context of federal assertions of authority over Indian affairs .
. . .173
Fletcher also argues that the overall applicability of the first
Montana exception is unclear because the cases on this exception

171 See Leonika Charging, Note, Atkinson Trading Company v. Shirley: A Taxing Decision
on Tribal Sovereign Power, 47 S.D. L. REV. 134, 151 (2002). The amicus brief for the United
States conveys regulations as “requir[ing] licensed businesses to comply with tribal health
regulations and standards for weights and measures, and to make themselves available semiannually at meetings of [a t]ribe’s governing body,” and “prohibit[ing] a licensee from selling
or leasing a building without the consent of both the Bureau of Indian Affairs and [a t]ribe.”
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Atkinson Trading
Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (No. 00-454), 2001 WL 185386, at *18; see also 25 C.F.R. §§
141.6(b), 141.9(d), 141.17, 141.22 (2016) (providing the specific statutory provisions).
172 Charging, supra note 171, at 156; see also Fletcher, supra note 35, at 101 (arguing that
congressional silence on the issue of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers should signal
courts to abstain from making more common law determinations that unnecessarily
complicate issues of tribal jurisdiction).
173 Fletcher, supra note 35, at 109–10.
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have all involved nonmembers who were “outliers in Indian
Country,” as opposed to the majority of nonmembers on reservation
land who do likely have the requisite consensual relationship with a
tribe.174 First, many nonmembers are employed with Indian tribes,
and thus have established the requisite consensual relationship.175
Second, nonmembers live on tribal lands in tribal housing, some of
whom have signed forms consenting to tribal jurisdiction and
regulation.176 For these reasons, most aspects of nonmember
reservation activity meet the requirements set forth in the Montana
exceptions.177
Consent theory, even in its confused state, has utility if applied
properly under the UNDRIP.178 Article 19 of the UNDRIP demands
free, prior, and informed consent before “adopting and
implementing legislative or administrative measures” that may
affect tribes but does not speak to judicial decisions, and courts
should defer to congressional silence on the issue of civil jurisdiction
over nonmembers.179
One important consideration in the FPIC implementation context
is federal preemption. However, preemption does not prohibit a
tribe, assuming that it has civil jurisdiction over the individuals and
land in question, from conditioning business upon FPIC, but tribal
regulatory authority is limited by federal law.180 Certainly some
environmental statutes—the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act,
and the Safe Drinking Water Act—provide for the treatment of
tribes as states (“TAS”) in administering regulatory programs.181
These programs, which can be no less protective than their federal
counterparts, allow tribes to tailor their regulatory efforts to unique
local conditions.182 The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
determines the extent of tribal jurisdiction under TAS programs on
a “[t]ribe-by-[t]ribe basis”183 and in addition,
[R]equir[es] “a showing that the potential impacts of
regulated activities on [a] tribe are serious and substantial”
before granting tribes TAS status throughout [a] reservation.
See id. at 110–11.
See id. at 115.
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 See id. at 116.
179 See id. at 117.
180 See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.
181 See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-11(a)(1), 7601(d)(1)(A).
182 See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(b); 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(B).
183 See Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal
Control Over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 627 (1994).
174
175
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However, [the] EPA has stated that “the activities regulated
under the various environmental statutes generally have
serious and substantial impacts on human health and
welfare,” and as a result, [the] EPA has determined that
tribes will usually be able to make the showing necessary to
obtain program delegation over all pollution sources within
the tribe’s territory.184
For most tribes, the regulatory authority conveyed by TAS
provisions extends to all activities except the surface mining of
tribal coal. Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977,185 which regulates the environmental impact of surface
exploration, mining, and reclamation on Indian lands, the
Department of the Interior’s Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement (“OSM”) is the sole permitting authority for the
mining of Indian coal.186
Absent a federal-tribal agreement, however, there is no
provision requiring OSM to consult directly with the affected
Indian tribes before issuing a permit.
Instead, the
regulations direct the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to be
responsible for tribal consultations. [Accordingly, t]he BIA
then makes recommendations to OSM concerning permits,
and OSM determines whether to approve or disapprove the
[requisite permits] . . . .187
Therefore, the exercise of tribal regulatory authority would be
limited to applicable federal authority when the resource at issue is
tribal coal.
VI. CORPORATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNDRIP
Corporations throughout the world must take steps to understand
and manage risks of opposition from indigenous communities lest
they suffer avoidable losses. In November 2014, First Peoples
Worldwide published the “Indigenous Rights Risk Report” (“Risk
Report”).188 This report provided quantified risk assessment for

Id.
See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (1977)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C. (2012)).
186 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 17.03[3] (Nell Jessup Newton ed.,
2012).
187 Id.
188 See FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS RISK REPORT 1 (2014), http://www.
firstpeoples.org/images/uploads/Indigenous%20Rights%20Risk%20Report(1).pdf [hereinafter
FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE, RISK REPORT].
184
185
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three hundred and thirty oil, gas, and mining projects conducted by
extractive industries “on or near [i]ndigenous territories.”189 The
report identified five risk factors, the “weighted average” of which
“determined a project’s risk score, gauging its susceptibility to
[i]ndigenous community opposition, or violations of [i]ndigenous
[p]eoples’ rights.”190 These factors were:
 Country Risk: “[T]he strength of legal protections for
[i]ndigenous [p]eoples, and the degree to which they
are enforced, in the country where the project is
located.”191
 Reputation Risk: “[C]urrent and former negative
attention to the project, and other projects in close
geographic proximity, from the media, NGOs, and
other groups that influence public opinion and can
affect the company’s reputation.”192
 Community Risk: “[T]he project’s susceptibility to
community opposition, and whether the conditions
are in place for successful community engagement.”193
 Legal Risk: “[C]urrent and former legal actions taken
against the project, and other projects in close
geographic proximity, in the past five years.”194
 Risk Management: “[T]he project’s efforts to establish
positive relations with impacted [i]ndigenous
[p]eoples, and mitigate its risk exposure to
[i]ndigenous [p]eoples’ rights.”195
The Risk Report made several significant findings. First, eightynine percent of the projects assessed had high (thirty-five percent)
or medium (fifty-four percent) risk exposure to “[i]ndigenous
community opposition or violations of [i]ndigenous [p]eoples’ rights .
. . .”196 Risk exposure was higher within the oil and gas industry
than within the mining industry, which is “possibly attributable to
the mining industry’s noticeably stronger standards related to
[i]ndigenous [p]eoples’ rights, compared to the oil and gas
industry.”197 Second, there is a “direct correlation between Country
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 24.
Id.
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Risk and projects’ overall risk scores,” meaning that “projects in
countries with weak or nonexistent legal protections for
[i]ndigenous [p]eoples were far more likely to receive high risk
scores.”198
The report then makes the connection between
governance and business as it pertains to indigenous rights: “These
numbers indicate that poor governance is bad for business.
Governments that disregard their commitments to UNDRIP (often
with the justification that they are obstacles to development)
actually propagate volatile business environments that threaten the
viability of investments in their countries.”199
Further, the Risk Report states that Legal Risk constituted only
five percent of each project’s overall risk assessment, but that there
was a trend of growth in the weight of this factor due to increasing
adherence to the UNDRIP:
While [Legal Risk] is a smaller percentage of risk than the
other indicators, First Peoples believes it is the fastest
growing, evidenced by strengthening legal protections for
[i]ndigenous [p]eoples’ rights around the world. Although
governments maintain that their commitments to UNDRIP
are aspirational and nonbinding, [i]ndigenous [p]eoples are
successfully using the document to influence domestic laws
and court rulings, and stop unwanted projects from moving
forward. Not only will this yield more lawsuits against
companies that violate FPIC, it also renders them
increasingly liable for retroactive damages from past abuses
of [i]ndigenous [p]eoples’ rights.200
The ICMM’s 2013 position statement exemplifies an uneasy
dynamic between companies and governments vis-a-vis the
UNDRIP and, in particular, indigenous communities’ right to FPIC.
As First Peoples Worldwide explains, the 2013 position statement
diverges significantly from the ICMM’s 2008 position statement.201
The 2008 Statement warned companies “not to rely too heavily on
national governments, which may have a history of dismissing
[i]ndigenous [p]eoples’ ‘distinct identity, legitimate interests, and
perhaps, their rights as articulated in relevant international
conventions.’”202 The 2008 Statement also encouraged companies to
Id. at 26.
Id.
200 Id. at 30.
201 See Mining Council’s “New” Commitment to FPIC Falls Short, FIRST PEOPLES
WORLDWIDE (June 25, 2013), http://firstpeoples.org/wp/mining-councils-new-commitment-tofpic-falls-short/ [hereinafter Mining Council’s “New” Commitment to FPIC].
202 Id.; see also INT’L COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, MINING AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES:
198
199
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communicate with governments about implementation gaps
regarding UNDRIP and other international agreements these
governments have joined.203 The 2013 Statement, on the other
hand, “allows member companies to rely on the ‘good faith’ of the
state and removes all language acknowledging that many
governments have a history of systemic oppression of [i]ndigenous
[p]eoples”204:
States have the right to make decisions on the development
of resources according to applicable national laws, including
those laws implementing host country obligations under
international law. Some countries have made an explicit
consent provision under national or sub-national laws. In
most countries however, “neither [i]ndigenous [p]eoples nor
any other population group have the right to veto
development projects that affect them,” so FPIC should be
regarded as a “principle to be respected to the greatest
degree
possible
in
development
planning
and
implementation.”205
The Equator Principles is a “risk management framework”206 that
has been adopted by eighty financial institutions throughout the
world “in order to ensure that the [p]rojects [these institutions]
finance and advise on are developed in a manner that is socially
responsible and reflects sound environmental management

POSITION STATEMENT (2008), http://hub.icmm.com/document/293 [hereinafter ICMM 2008
POSITION STATEMENT] (“Some governments in the past, and sometimes still today, have not
recognized their distinct identity, legitimate interests and, perhaps, their rights as
articulated in relevant international conventions. Conversely, governments sometimes may
have concerns that rights or autonomy demanded by [i]ndigenous [p]eoples should not conflict
with national development priorities or the integrity of the state and any possible
inconsistencies need to be properly considered. A range of international instruments exist in
this area.”).
203 See Mining Council’s “New” Commitment to FPIC, supra note 201; see also ICMM 2008
POSITION STATEMENT, supra note 202 (“Legal frameworks should preferably be developed in
consultation with [i]ndigenous [p]eoples and allow for processes which allow them to
participate effectively. Where existing national or provincial law deals with [i]ndigenous
[p]eoples issues, the provisions of such laws will prevail over the content of this [p]osition
[s]tatement to the extent of any inconsistencies. Where no relevant law exists the [p]osition
[s]tatement will guide member practices. ICMM members are not political decision-makers
and cannot disregard national laws or national government policy. Equally, some national
legal frameworks may be no more than a minimum requirement for companies seeking to
build relationships of respect and trust with [i]ndigenous [p]eoples. Companies may also
sometimes legitimately point out in discussions with governments any gaps in
implementation of international conventions which they have agreed to and ratified.”).
204 Mining Council’s “New” Commitment to FPIC, supra note 201.
205 ICMM 2008 POSITION STATEMENT, supra note 202.
206 EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.com/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
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practices.”207 The latest edition of the Equator Principles, published
in 2013, expressly requires that “[p]rojects with adverse impacts on
indigenous people will require their . . . [FPIC].”208 The principles
also provide a working definition for FPIC:
There is no universally accepted definition of FPIC. Based
on good faith negotiation between the client and affected
indigenous communities, FPIC builds on and expands the
process of Informed Consultation and Participation, ensures
the meaningful participation of indigenous peoples in
decision-making, and focuses on achieving agreement. FPIC
does not require unanimity, does not confer veto rights to
individuals or sub-groups, and does not require the client to
agree to aspects not under their control. Process elements to
achieve FPIC are found in IFC Performance Standard 7.209
This reliance on IFC Performance Standards in establishing
criteria demonstrates that institutions influencing what types of
projects receive financing are using international standards for
guidance, which could put more pressure on both governments and
corporations to take steps toward UNDRIP implementation.
VII. LIMITING UNDRIP
The four initial objectors to the UNDRIP (the U.S., Canada, New
Zealand, and Australia)210 have managed to maintain their own
terms on indigenous rights whether in objecting to or in endorsing
the UNDRIP.
According to one scholar, “[p]atriarchal white
sovereignty’s possessive logic determines what constitutes
[i]ndigenous peoples’ rights, and what they will be subjected to in
accordance with its authority and law.”211
Attorney Akilah Jenga Kinnison describes a consultation-consent
207 EQUATOR PRINCIPLES FIN. INSTS., THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES 2 (2013), http://www.
equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles_III.pdf.
208 Id. at 8.
209 Id. at 8 n.3; see also INT’L FIN. CORP., IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY: PERFORMANCE STANDARD 7: INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES 50 (2012) (showing how the 2013 Equator Principles’ FPIC standard is consistent
with that of the IFC Performance Standard 7).
210 See Megan Davis, To Bind or Not to Bind: The United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples Five Years On, 19 AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 17, 18 (2012).
211 Aileen Moreton-Robinson, Virtuous Racial States: The Possessive Logic of Patriarchal
White Sovereignty and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 20
GRIFFITH L. REV. 641, 644, 656 (2011) (“[T]he possessive logic of patriarchal white sovereignty
operates discursively, deploying virtue as a strategic device to oppose and subsequently
endorse the Declaration. As an attribute of patriarchal white sovereignty, virtue functions as
a useable property to dispossess [i]ndigenous peoples from the ground of moral value.”).
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spectrum that exists in international law, even with the UNDRIP in
place:
Although an international consensus has emerged about the
importance of the principle of FPIC, there remains no
singular, commonly accepted definition of the term “consent”
as it is used in articulating the principle. Rather, a spectrum
of interpretations of the principle of FPIC has developed in
addition to the emerging view that different contexts invoke
different
obligations
along
this
spectrum.
Thus,
operationalizing FPIC requires examining the types of
activities a state considers implementing and their likely or
possible consequences. At a minimum, states have a duty to
engage in prior, meaningful consultation in good faith with
indigenous peoples concerning activities that affect them.
The more a particular activity or development project affects
indigenous peoples and their lands, the greater the required
level of participation and consultation. . . . [T]he U.N.
Declaration explicitly recognizes a state duty to obtain full
consent before moving ahead with a project only in the
contexts of forced relocation and storage or dumping of toxic
materials.212
Kinnison goes on to assert that “there seems to be a shift in the
international arena toward viewing states’ duty to consult with
indigenous peoples as falling on the consent end of the consultationconsent spectrum” for any activity directly affecting their
traditional lands.213 Kinnison concludes that this is the appropriate
path for the United States to take as well:
The United States has articulated a commitment to the
importance of indigenous consultation both through its
endorsement of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples and its domestic policies, such as E.O.
13,175 and President Obama’s Tribal Consultation
Memorandum. However, in order to fully realize this
commitment, the United States should embrace a policy shift
away from the currently articulated meaningful consultation
standard. U.S. law and policy should move toward viewing
indigenous consultation as involving a spectrum of
requirements—with good-faith, meaningful consultation as a
212 Akilah Jenga Kinnison, Note, Indigenous Consent: Rethinking U.S. Consultation
Policies in Light of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 53 ARIZ. L. REV.
1301, 1327–28 (2011).
213 Id. at 1328.
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minimum and with consent required in certain contexts,
including large-scale extractive industries.214
Neither President Obama’s remarks at the White House Tribal
Nations Conference in December 2010 nor the “Announcement of
U.S. Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples” (“Announcement”) appear to represent a shift
toward the consent side of the spectrum.215 The remarks and the
Announcement continue to refer to consultation (rather than
consent) throughout, and the Announcement alarmingly dismisses
consent as a necessary element of “meaningful consultation” with
tribes even under the UNDRIP’s FPIC regime: “[T]he United States
recognizes the significance of the Declaration’s provisions on free,
prior, and informed consent, which the United States understands
to call for a process of meaningful consultation with tribal leaders,
but not necessarily the agreement of those leaders, before the
actions addressed in those consultations are taken.”216
This perpetuation of the consultation status quo has not gone
unnoticed. In a June 30, 2012, article, a journalist argued that the
Obama Administration is pursuing a path of least resistance
concerning the UNDRIP:
Whether UNDRIP will be successful in the U.S. will depend
on whether the government chooses to apply it in a way that
gets past the status quo of current federal-tribal policy. . . .
Many officials in the Obama administration familiar with
Indian policy know that UNDRIP adds a new dimension to
federal-tribal relations. It’s just that for now the easiest
Id. at 1331.
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 2, 3, 5 (2010), http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/184099.pdf [hereinafter ANNOUNCEMENT]; Remarks by the President
at the White House Tribal Nations Conference, WHITE HOUSE: OFF. PRESS SECRETARY (Dec.
16, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/remarks-president-whitehouse-tribal-nations-conference.
216 ANNOUNCEMENT, supra note 215, at 5; see also Update of IFC’s Policy and Performance
Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, and Access to Information Policy,
REDD-MONITOR (May 12, 2011), http://www.redd-monitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/IFC
-policy-review-final-policy-May-12-2011-US-position-to-post.pdf (“With respect to the concept
of . . . [FPIC], as the U.S. explained at the time it announced its support for the [U.N.]
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the U.S. understands the concept of . . .
‘FPIC’ to call for a process of meaningful consultation with tribal leaders, but not necessarily
the agreement of those leaders, before the actions addressed in those consultations are taken.
In the context of the Sustainability Policy and Performance Standards, the IFC has proposed
a higher threshold for some projects. The U.S. supports additional protections for indigenous
peoples in the context of certain projects with special circumstances. However, the U.S. does
not believe there is an international consensus in favor of a definition of FPIC that requires
the agreement of indigenous peoples.”).
214
215
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course of action is to offer a façade of understanding, while
largely continuing in a status quo manner.217
In the June 9, 2011, Oversight Hearing before the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs, tribal leaders expressed the need for
Congress to take legislative action to effectuate free, prior, and
informed consent.218 The Black Hills Sioux Nation Treaty Council
brought attention to its 2011 “Resolution of the Black Hills Sioux
Nation Treaty Council: Rejection of the United States’ Statement of
U.S. Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples” (“Resolution”) in repudiating the use of federal
Indian law to limit tribal rights.219 This Resolution contains the
following condemnation of the U.S.’s Announcement:
The world has long recognized that the United States has
lost any moral authority it may have ever claimed with
regards to human rights or even the international laws of
aggression and peace. This statement is further indication
that, rather than leading in the work in human rights, the
United States prefers to arrogantly stand outside the circle
of nations while demanding that others conform to policies
the U.S. is happy to violate. They even manage to get in a
comment that reduces Native Americans (and probably,
more significantly, our lands and territories) to an exclusive
right of dominion. Apparently the State Department and the
President are comfortable referring to Indians in a
subservient, unequal and even proprietary manner.220
The Resolution then provides the following strongly worded
recommendation for a preferred course of action for the U.S.:
We would respectfully suggest that a good start at moving
ahead togethering [sic] would be to honestly endorse the
Declaration, recognize the human rights of [i]ndigenous
217 Rob Capriccioso, The Obama Administration Now Supports UNDRIP—But that’s not
Enough, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (June 30, 2011), http://indiancountry
todaymedianetwork.com/2011/06/30/obama-administration-now-supports-undrip-thats-notenough-40428.
218 See Setting the Standard: Domestic Policy Implications of the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong.
44–45 (2011) (statement of Fawn R. Sharp, President, Quinault Indian Nation) [hereinafter
Setting the Standard]; NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., NATIVE PEOPLES–NATIVE
HOMELANDS: CLIMATE CHANGE WORKSHOP II FINAL REPORT 121–24 (Nancy G. Maynard ed.,
2009), https://neptune.gsfc.nasa.gov/uploads/images_db/NPNH-Report-No-Blanks.pdf.
219 See Setting the Standard, supra note 218, at 117–18.
220 BLACK HILLS SIOUX NATION TREATY COUNCIL, RESOLUTION: REJECTION OF THE UNITED
STATES’ STATEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 2 (2011), http://www.oweakuinternational.org/_Media/bhsntcrejection-of-us.pdf.
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peoples, and honor the [three hundred and thirty-five]
treaties that have been broken. As it stands, the U.S.
support of the Declaration is a meaningless shell that
permits the American people and their government to
continue the colonial policies it has practised [sic] with
respect to Indian peoples since the settler nation, the United
States, established its own right to self-determination. To
expect that we, as [i]ndigenous peoples, would accept
anything less is a barely veiled attempt to deny our
humanity.221
While the Sioux Nation’s manner of expression may be particular
to that tribe, the foregoing material shows that the Black Hills
Sioux Nation is not alone in recognizing that the Announcement of
U.S. support for the UNDRIP fails to compel deviation from the
status quo of federal Indian law.
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION AND THE CONTEMPORARY CONSULTATION
SCHEME IN THE U.S.
Like FPIC, the consultation regime in the United States cannot
be fully traced back to a single authoritative source. Rather, it has
developed over time through statutory language and executive
actions. The contemporary executive action that provides the most
direct guidance on consultation with tribes is Executive Order
13,175 (“E.O. 13,175”).222 However, events prior to E.O. 13,175
contributed to the development of a consultation regime.223 The
following conveys some important pre-executive order events that
helped build the foundation for the consultation regime as it exists
today. In 1970, President Nixon’s Special Message to Congress
acknowledged:
[T]hat the federal government had a duty “to provide
community services such as health, education and public
safety” to Indian people. He also noted that only 1.5 percent
of the Department of [the] Interior’s programs that were
directly serving Indians were under Indian control. The
Id. at 3.
See Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
223 See, e.g., Colette Routel & Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal Consultation in the
21st Century, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417, 436 (2013); see also Michael Eitner, Comment,
Meaningful Consultation with Tribal Governments: A Uniform Standard to Guarantee that
Federal Agencies Properly Consider Their Concerns, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 867, 87476 (2014)
(describing presidential actions between 1994 and 2000 that emphasized the importance of a
consultation regime).
221
222
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President admonished Congress and federal officials [to] “. . .
make it clear that Indians can become independent of
[f]ederal control without being cut off from [f]ederal concern
and support.”224
In 1972, the BIA promulgated its “Guidelines for Consultation
with Tribal Groups on Personnel Management within the Bureau of
Indian Affairs” (“Guidelines”), in response to Nixon’s 1970 Special
Message.225 These Guidelines defined consultation as “providing
pertinent information to and obtaining the views of tribal governing
bodies.”226 Allowing for the BIA to determine the level of tribal
consultation depending on the circumstances, the Guidelines
proposed that the BIA enter into “agreements with individual tribes
to ensure that the parties had a ‘clear understanding’ of the scope
and intensity of tribal consultation.”227
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975 was:
[T]he first statute that required consultation with Indian
tribes in certain circumstances. The Secretary of [the]
Interior and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
were required to consult with “national and regional Indian
organizations” while drafting both the initial regulations
implementing the provisions of the Act and any future
amendments thereto. And Congress required consultation
with any Indian tribe that could be impacted by any BIA
decision to assist a state in site acquisition, construction, or
renovation of a school on or near an Indian reservation.228
Further statutes “require[ed] consultation for federal activities
that impact Indian historic, cultural, and religious sites,” including
“the Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, and the
1992 Amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act.”229
President Clinton’s 1994 memorandum, entitled “Government-toGovernment Relations with Native American Tribal Governments,”
stated: “Each executive department and agency shall consult, to the
greatest extent practicable and to the extent permitted by law, with
Routel & Holth, supra note 223, at 436.
See id.
226 Id. at 437.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 438.
229 Id. at 439–40; see, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 3002(b) (2012); Reclamation Projects Authorization
and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 4006, 106 Stat. 4600, 4757, 4757 (1992)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
224
225
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tribal governments prior to taking actions that affect federally
recognized tribal governments.”230
E.O. 13175, issued by President Clinton in 2000, requires federal
agencies to “defer to Indian tribes to establish standards” when
formulating or implementing policies and requires that agencies
have “an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input
by tribal officials in the development of regulatory policies that have
tribal implications.”231
This executive order applies both to
regulations that “impose[] substantial direct compliance costs on
Indian tribal governments” and regulations that preempt tribal
law.232
There are several notable limitations to the U.S. consultation
requirement. First, independent regulatory agencies are merely
“encouraged to comply with the provisions of this order,” reflecting a
limited scope of the order’s directive.233 Second, the administrative
limitations imposed in this order only apply “[t]o the extent
practicable”234 and there is no guidance in the language of the order
regarding who or what decides the practicability threshold.235 The
consultation requirement, while detailed from a procedural
standpoint, is rather unilateral in nature and does not appear to
impose any requirements for what constitutes tribal consent or
whether tribal consent is even a defining element of tribal
consultation.236 Third, the contemporary consultation regime is also
230 Routel & Holth, supra note 223, at 442; see also Eitner, supra note 223, at 874–75 (“The
Memorandum directed agencies to build ‘more effective day-to-day working’ relationships
with tribal governments that reflect respect for tribes as sovereign nations. Additionally, the
Memorandum instructed agencies to conduct ‘open and candid’ consultations. Importantly,
the Memorandum closed with a notice that it was issued only ‘to improve the internal
management of the executive branch’ and did not create a cause of action for tribes to enforce
meaningful consultation.”).
231 Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,250 (Nov. 6, 2000); see also
Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881, 57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009) (“My
Administration is committed to regular and meaningful consultation and collaboration with
tribal officials in policy decisions that have tribal implications including, as an initial step,
through complete and consistent implementation of Executive Order 13175. Accordingly, I
hereby direct each agency head to submit to the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), within 90 days after the date of this memorandum, a detailed plan of actions
the agency will take to implement the policies and directives of Executive Order 13175.”).
232 Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67,250.
233 Id. at 67,251.
234 Id. at 67,250.
235 Id.
236 See generally id. at 67,250–51 (discussing the fact that the procedural requirements are
particularly detailed regarding the consultation requirement vis-à-vis direct compliance costs
on tribal governments; requiring funds needed for compliance to be provided by the federal
government; consultation with tribes at an early stage of the process and an agency
statement summarizing tribal concerns as well as the extent to which these concerns have
been met; and the agency’s position on the necessity of the regulation).
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defined, and limited, by statute. In his 2013 statement before the
Secretarial Commission on Indian Trust Administration and
Reform, Matthew Fletcher promoted the creation of a congressional
statute that “would effectively incorporate express Indian and tribal
consultation and consent requirements into federal Indian affairs
policy.”237 In doing so, he cites to a number of examples of
consultation requirements established by Congress.238
These
examples include the Self-Determination Act, the Native American
Languages Act, Contract Health Service Administration and
Disbursement, Indian Law Enforcement Reform, and the Indian
Civil Rights Act Model Code.239 Fletcher then goes on to cite
examples of times in which Congress has “severely undercut the
consultation requirement by giving the federal agencies an out if
consultation becomes too onerous.”240 In these examples, Fletcher
points to the same “practicability” language as that which is present
in E.O. 13,175:
For example, in the Self-Determination Act: “The Secretary
is authorized to revise and amend any rules or regulations
promulgated pursuant to subsection (a) of this section:
[p]rovided, [t]hat prior to any revision or amendment to such
rules or regulations the Secretary shall, to the extent
practicable, consult with appropriate national and regional
Indian organizations, and shall publish any proposed
revisions in the Federal Register not less than sixty days
prior to the effective date of such rules and regulations in
order to provide adequate notice to, and receive comments
from, other interested parties.”241
Fletcher then referred to the following statement by Oneida
Nation representative Ray Halbritter from a May 17, 2012,
Oversight Hearing before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs
as a summary of Fletcher’s argument about the incomplete status of
the current consultation regime:
The lifeblood of the unique trust relationship between the
United States and Indian tribes is consultation, and the
237 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Statement of Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Michigan State University
College of Law and Indigenous Law and Policy Center Before the Secretarial Commission on
Indian Trust Administration and Reform 15 (Mich. State U. Coll. of Law & Indigenous L. &
Pol’y Ctr., Research Paper No. 11-10, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2262790.
238 See id. at 17–18.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 18.
241 Id.
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pathway to a robust trust relationship is likely through
consultation that is redesigned to better meet the needs of
both parties to the relationship. Although most modern
[p]residents have recognized the need for meaningful
government-to-government
consultation,
consultation
continues to be regarded by agencies as burdensome and an
impediment to [f]ederal action rather than a mechanism to
protect Tribal treaty rights and appropriate [f]ederal
decision making. Matters are further complicated when the
[f]ederal government blurs the important distinction
between [t]ribal consultation and all other communication
with non-federal interests, even where consultation with
non-tribal parties may be required by law.242
Fletcher seems to refer to consent separately from his discussion
on consultation.243 He identifies six articles in the UNDRIP that
expressly demand free, prior, and informed consent, including
Articles 10, 11, 19, 28, 29, and 32.244 He notes a few limited
examples of instances in which federal agencies have been required
to obtain consent, but he concludes that “the history of American
Indian affairs demonstrates conclusively that the federal
government’s Indian affairs actions take almost no consideration of
tribal consent.”245
Id. at 19.
See id. at 20.
244 See id.
Fletcher’s examples of instances in which consent was required of federal
agencies include 25 U.S.C. § 140. Id. (“The several appropriations made for millers,
blacksmiths, engineers, carpenters, physicians, and other persons, and for various articles
provided for by treaty stipulation for the several Indian tribes, may be diverted to other uses
for the benefit of said tribes, respectively, within the discretion of the President, and with the
consent of said tribes, expressed in the usual manner; and he shall cause report to be made to
Congress, at its next session thereafter, of his action under this provision.”). Additionally, the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a), provides:
“Where any parent or Indian custodian voluntarily consents to a foster care placement or
to termination of parental rights, such consent shall not be valid unless executed in
writing and recorded before a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction and accompanied
by the presiding judge’s certificate that the terms and consequences of the consent were
fully explained in detail and were fully understood by the parent or Indian custodian.”
Id. at 21. Next, Fletcher discusses 25 U.S.C. § 402a, which provides:
The unallotted irrigable lands on any Indian reservation may be leased for farming
purposes for not to exceed ten years with the consent of the tribal council, business
committee, or other authorized body representative of the Indians, under such rules and
regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe.
Id. Last, Fletcher discusses 25 U.S.C. § 63, which provides: “The President may, in his
discretion, consolidate two or more agencies into one, and where Indians are located on
reservations created by [e]xecutive order he may, with the consent of the tribes to be affected
thereby, expressed in the usual manner, consolidate one or more tribes, and abolish such
agencies as are thereby rendered unnecessary.” Id.
245 Id.
242
243

429 FREDERICKS PRODUCTION (DO NOT DELETE)

472

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 80.2

A. A Recent Case Study: The Dakota Access Pipeline
The 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie established the boundary of the
Great Sioux Reservation, an area whose territories have continually
diminished in the last century and a half.246 One of the more recent
diminutions occurred in 1958 with the passage of federal Public
Law 85-915, through which Congress revoked treaty lands granted
to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.247 The law was the culmination
of government actions committed in the absence of tribal
consultation, beginning with the authorization of the Oahe Dam
and Reservoir project in 1944.248 Construction of the dam by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) began in 1948.249
The purpose of the dam was to control flooding of the Missouri
River, to improve irrigation, and to provide hydroelectric power.250
In providing these benefits, the dam created Lake Oahe, a reservoir
that submerged almost seven hundred miles of tribal lands and
displaced thousands of indigenous people.251 The lands that were
flooded in the construction of the Oahe Dam were the indigenous
peoples’ most fertile and abundant in wildlife.252 In addition, in
displacing indigenous peoples from the Missouri River watershed,
the Army Corps failed to relocate Native American graves.253
The Oahe Dam was part of the larger Pick-Sloan project, which
has been described by the scholar Vine Deloria, Jr. as “the single
most destructive act ever perpetuated on any tribe by the United
States.”254 The Pick-Sloan Plan, whose primary purpose was flood
control, authorized and facilitated the construction of several dams
on the main stem.255 All told, the dams on the Missouri River,
tributaries not included, submerged over 356,000 acres of Native
246 See History, STANDING ROCK, http://standingrock.org/history/ (last visited Feb. 21,
2017).
247 Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-915, § 1, 72 Stat. 1762, 1762 (providing for
acquisition of Standing Rock Reservation lands by the United States).
248 See id.
249 See Lake Oahe, S.D. MO. RIVER TOURISM, http://sdmissouririver.com/follow-the-river/
the-four-lakes-and-dams/lake-oahe/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
250 See Peter Capossela, Impacts of the Army Corps of Engineers’ Pick-Sloan Program on
the Indian Tribes of the Missouri River Basin, 30 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 144, 144–45 (2015).
251 See Christina Rose, Echoes of Oak Flat: 4 Pick Sloan Dams that Submerged Native
Lands, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (Sept. 11, 2015), https://indiancountrymedia
network.com/history/events/echoes-of-oak-flat-4-pick-sloan-dams-that-submerged-nativelands/.
252 See Ojibwa, Dam Indians: The Missouri River, NATIVE AM. NETROOTS (Mar. 10, 2010),
http://nativeamericannetroots.net/diary/406.
253 See Capossela, supra note 250, at 158 & n.115.
254 Id. at 157–58.
255 See id. at 144–45.
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American lands and devastated precious resources and historically
significant sites.256 Displaced indigenous peoples relocated to
barren lands with inadequate infrastructure, which the Army Corps
was required by law to improve but never did.257 Most affected were
the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nations; the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe; the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe; the Crow Creek Sioux
Tribe; the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe; the Yankton Sioux Tribe; and
the Nebraska Tribe.258
Though Congress provided monetary
compensation to the tribes, the devastating effects of Pick-Sloan
persist today in the form of poverty and continued conflicts over
tribal lands.259 Particularly, the tainted history of Lake Oahe has
resurfaced in the ongoing Dakota Access Pipeline controversy.260
In terms of the pipeline’s location and capacity:
The Dakota Access Pipeline is a 1,168-mile-long pipeline
that, if completed, would carry 570,000 barrels of crude oil
daily from the Bakken region of North Dakota across four
states to refineries in southern Illinois. . . . The pipeline
[would] run[] near the Missouri River, upstream of the water
supply of numerous tribal nations, and [would] cross[] under
the river at Lake Oahe, less than one mile north of the
Standing Rock Sioux Reservation.261
The pipeline would go across land that was promised to the Great
Sioux Nation in the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851.262 The pipeline
would intersect the treaty reservation and traditional territories of
the Great Sioux Nation, lands to which the various modern-day
Sioux Tribes continue to have strong cultural, spiritual, and
historical ties.263
See id. at 145.
See id.
258 See id. at 155–56.
The author wishes to acknowledge that she is a member of the
Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation, and that her father’s childhood home and community
was a casualty of the flooding.
259 See id. at 179, 216–17.
260 See Aaron Sidder, Understanding the Controversy behind the Dakota Access Pipeline:
What to Know as Protestors and the Oil Company Continue to Clash, SMITHSONIAN (Sept. 14,
2016),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/understanding-controversy-behinddakota-access-pipeline-180960450/.
261 Letter from David Archambault II, Chairman, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe et al., to
Emilio Álvarez Icaza Longoria, Exec. Sec’y, Inter-American Comm’n on Human Rights (Dec.
2, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/12/09/document_pm_03.pdf [hereinafter
Standing Rock Letter].
262 See Steven Mufson, A Dakota Pipeline’s Last Stand, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-dakota-pipelines-last-stand/2016/11/25
/35a5dd32-b02c-11e6-be1c-8cec35b1ad25_story.html?utm_term=.b678ff2461d3.
263 See Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Standing Tall: The Sioux’s Battle against a
Dakota Oil Pipeline is a Galvanizing Social Justice Movement for Native Americans, SLATE
256
257
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The Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in North Dakota and
South Dakota is the sixth largest Indian reservation in the
United States.
The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe has
approximately [eighteen thousand] enrolled members. The
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation is adjacent to the
Standing Rock Sioux Reservation to the south.
Like
Standing Rock, Cheyenne River’s eastern border is Lake
Oahe. The Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation is the fourth
largest Indian reservation in the United States.
The
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe has [sixteen thousand] enrolled
members. The Yankton Sioux Reservation borders the
Missouri River in southern South Dakota. The Yankton
Sioux Tribe has approximately [nine thousand] members.264
Without an “adequate social, cultural or environmental
assessment, . . . on July 25, 2016, the Corps gave multiple domestic
authorizations permitting the construction of [the Dakota Access
Pipeline]. One such authorization permitted construction beneath
the Missouri River at Lake Oahe, while another authorized the
discharge of materials and waste into waters throughout the
[t]ribes’ ancestral lands.”265 The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe filed a
lawsuit against the Army Corps in United States district court,
alleging that in granting the permit without consulting with the
tribal government the agency violated multiple domestic statutes,
including the National Environmental Policy Act, the National
Historic Preservation Act, the Rivers and Harbors Act, and the
Clean Water Act.266 The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, downstream
from Standing Rock Reservation, joined the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe in its suit late in August.267 In September, the Yankton Sioux
(Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/09/why
_the_sioux_battle_against_the_dakota_access_pipeline_is_such_a_big_deal.html. The Great
Sioux Nation refers to the historical political structure of the indigenous people residing in
the Northern Great Plains region of the United States. See The Sioux, BUFFALO BILL CTR.
WEST,
https://centerofthewest.org/explore/plains-indians/paul-dyck-collection-sioux/
(last
visited Mar. 3, 2017). As a result of decades of federal policies aimed at breaking up the
tribes and bands, “[t]oday, the Sioux maintain many separate tribal governments scattered
across several reservations, communities, and reserves in the Dakotas, Nebraska, Minnesota,
and Montana . . . .” Id.
264 Standing Rock Letter, supra note 261.
265 Id.
266 See Complaint at 2, 17, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No.
1:16-cv-01534 (D.D.C. July 27, 2016).
267 See Blake Nicholson, Deadline Looms for Dakota Access Pipeline Protest Camp, CHI.
TRIBUNE (Feb. 20, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-dakota-accesspipeline-camp-deadline-20170220-story.html; Levi Rickert, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Now
Part of Dakota Access Pipeline Lawsuit, NATIVE NEWS ONLINE (Aug. 22, 2016), http://native
newsonline.net/currents/cheyenne-river-sioux-tribe-now-part-dakota-access-pipeline-lawsuit/.
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Tribe filed its own lawsuit against the Army Corps and the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service.268
Tribes have long been connected to these lands for multiple
reasons:
The culture and identity of the [t]ribes are deeply connected
to the land and waters of their traditional territories.
Because of a history of colonization, dispossession, and
genocidal government policies, the [t]ribes have lost, or
nearly lost, important parts of their land, language, stories,
and history.
Their connection to sacred, cultural and
historical sites associated with their traditional territories is
essential to maintaining what remains of their culture and
identity.269
Because of this deep connection and spiritual relationship,
members from the tribes began a prayer camp to protest the
pipeline.270
The controversy surrounding [the Dakota Access Pipeline]. . .
[drew] thousands of people—members of the [t]ribes and
many indigenous and non-indigenous members of civil
society not formally associated with the [t]ribes—to the
banks of the Missouri River outside of Cannon Ball, North
Dakota, near where [the Dakota Access Pipeline] would cross
under the river, for prayer and peaceful protest in defense of
the lands, resources, cultural property, and waters
threatened by [the Dakota Access Pipeline]. Spanning over
[seven] months, this gathering . . . [was] the largest
gathering of indigenous peoples in the United States in more
than [one hundred] years.271
In response to the tribes’ concerns and public outcry from across
the globe, in September 2016 the Army Corps called for a halt on
construction of the pipeline on land bordering or beneath Lake
Oahe.272 In December 2016, the Standing Rock, Cheyenne River,

268 See ICMN Staff, Yankton Sioux Tribe Sues US Army Corps, USFWS Over Dakota
Access, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.indiancountry
medianetwork.com/news/native-news/yankton-sioux-tribe-sues-us-army-corps-usfws-overdakota-access/.
269 Standing Rock Letter, supra note 261.
270 See id. at 7.
271 Id.
272 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Joint Statement from the Dep’t of Justice, the
Dep’t of the Army & the Dep’t of the Interior Regarding Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint-statementdepartment-justice-department-army-and-department-interior-regarding-standing.
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and Yankton Sioux Tribes were granted a thematic hearing before
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to address
concerns over violations of human rights to life, personal integrity,
health, property, access to information, public participation in
decision-making, and access to justice.273 Additionally, the tribes
requested that the Commission call upon the United States
government to adopt precautionary measures to safeguard the
rights to culture, personal security, health, and property of the
indigenous peoples involved.274
On December 4, 2016, the Army Corps announced its decision to
deny the final easement necessary for construction pending the
development of a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement,
which is to be developed in close collaboration with the tribes.275
However, on January 20, 2017, Donald Trump was sworn in as the
President of the United States.276 Days after entering office,
President Trump issued a presidential memorandum which called
on the Army Corps to take expedited action to review and approve
requests for approvals to construct the pipeline.277 On February 7,
the Army Corps announced that it will grant the final approval
needed to complete construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline,
without conducting an Environmental Impact Statement.278 On
February 9, the Cheyenne River Tribe filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction to halt construction until the validity of the
Army Corps’ action could be determined.279 The Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe also challenged the easement on the grounds that the
Environmental Impact Statement was wrongfully terminated.280
This case represents the contemporary challenges in the United
States to realization of FPIC by indigenous peoples, as well to the
See Standing Rock Letter, supra note 261.
See id.
275 See Press Release, U.S. Army, Army Will Not Grant Easement for Dakota Access
Pipeline Crossing (Dec. 4, 2016), https://www.army.mil/article/179095/army_will_not_grant
_easement_for_dakota_access_pipeline_crossing.
276 See Presidential Inauguration 2017, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/inauguration-2017
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
277 See Memorandum on Construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, 2017 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 67 (Jan. 24, 2017).
278 See Timothy Cama, Trump Administration Giving Final Green Light to Dakota Access
Pipeline, HILL (Feb. 7, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/318341-trumpadmin-to-approve-dakota-access-oil-pipeline.
279 See Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, No. 1:16-cv-1534 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2017).
280 See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Asks Federal Court to Set Aside Trump’s Pipeline
Reversal; Critical Motion Charges Trump Administration Circumvents Law and Ignores
Treaty Rights, EARTHJUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/features/faq-standing-rock-litigation
(last updated Feb. 14, 2017).
273
274
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human rights described in the UNDRIP.281 The U.S. government
did not apply the standard of FPIC to meaningfully consult tribal
governments and consider the impacts on tribal governments within
the meaning of FPIC because if failed to include impact analysis on
any tribal lands or reservations despite the proximity of the
Standing Rock Sioux, Ft. Berthold, and Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation.282 Applying the UNDRIP’s FPIC standard, a project
impacting the lands, territories, and resources of the Tribes should
not occur without adequate consultations with, and the free, prior
and informed consent of, the indigenous populations concerned.283
B. Implications of the Indian Reorganization Act
In 1933, Nathan Margold appointed Felix Cohen and Melvin
Siegel to draft the Indian Reorganization Act.284 A number of
external materials may have influenced how the bill was drafted
and later amended, though knowledge of the facts surrounding
these sources is incomplete. Notable amongst these sources,

281 A full examination of the facts and issues surrounding the Dakota Access Pipeline
conflict is the subject of a forthcoming article by the author.
282 See, e.g., Letter from Lawrence S. Roberts, Acting Assistant Sec’y—Indian Affairs, Dep’t
of the Interior, to Brent Cossette, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Mar. 29, 2016),
http://indigenousrising.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/DOI-Signed-Standing-Rock-CorpsLetter.pdf [hereinafter DOI Letter]. Three separate federal agencies—the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Department of the Interior, and the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation—as well as the Standing Rock Sioux tribal government itself, allege that the
Army Corps failed to meaningfully engage the Standing Rock Sioux tribal government at any
point in their assessment process leading to the recent authorizations and subsequent
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline. See DOI Letter; Letter from Reid J. Nelson, Dir.,
Advisory Council on Historic Pres., to Lieutenant Gen. Thomas P. Bostick, Commanding Gen.
& Chief of Eng’rs, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (May 19, 2016), http://www.achp.gov/docs/nd-sdia-il.coe.dakota%20access.con04.19may16.pdf [hereinafter ACHP Letter]; Letter from Philip
S. Strobel, Dir., Nat’l Envtl. Policy Act Compliance & Review Program, Envtl. Prot. Agency,
to Brent Cossette, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Mar. 11 2016), http://indigenousrising.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Dakota-Access-2nd-DEA-cmts-3-11-16.pdf [hereinafter EPA Letter].
Each of the three federal agencies wrote separate letters to the Army Corps, and these
sources claim that although the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and others have repeatedly
sought consultation with the Army Corps throughout their review process, the Army Corps
had yet to meaningfully engage or coordinate with any tribe while carrying out their cultural
and environmental impact studies relating to the pipeline. See ACHP Letter; DOI Letter;
EPA Letter. The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation’s letter specifically outlined
concerns regarding the Army Corps’ lack of consultation with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.
See ACHP Letter. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the
Interior’s letters also indicated that, in their judgment, the Army Corps failed to meet the
government-to-government consultation requirements mandated in the domestic laws of the
United States. See DOI Letter; EPA Letter.
283 See G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 1, arts. 1, 2, 8, 11, 12, 18, 19, 28, 29, 37, 38.
284 See ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT 192–93 (2000).
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though, is the “Tentative Statement of Indian Land Policy”
(“Shepard document”).285 This document has no known author but
is presumed to have been authored by former BIA forestry expert
Ward Shepard.286 Former BIA Commissioner John Collier had
identified Shepard as one of the “chief producers of ideas” for the
bill.287 The Shepard document assumed “the truth of the vacuum
theory of Indian political life—that most tribal institutions had
disappeared.”288 Author Elmer Rusco describes the crux of the
proposal contained in the Shepard document as follows:
“[Twenty] or more families should be gathered into a small
village, with a school and community house, gardens, water
supply, etc., and from this center should use their individual
allotments or tribal lands, as the case may be.” What
Shepard had in mind was a program for establishing model
communities, created by “expert” Bureau officials. . . . In
general, there is nothing in his initial approach that shows
an awareness of existing Native American structures or any
sense that these should be recognized and strengthened.289
According to Rusco, Cohen and Siegel’s approach to bill drafting
reflected the same basic ideas: “[T]he Cohen-Siegel approach . . .
assumed that the central purpose of the land policy was to bring
about the organization of Indians into communities, although . . .
[t]here was no suggestion of organization at the reservation level; in
fact, it was proposed that some communities could be established
among ‘scattered’ Indians . . . .”290
Rusco later explains the importance of the “vacuum theory” in
drafting the bill:
A key underlying assumption of the drafters was the vacuum
theory.
The allotment program and other aspects of
governmental policy over several decades, which effectively
were part of the forced assimilation ideology dominating
Indian policy since 1887, were thought to have destroyed
most Indian governments and even a good deal of Indian
social structure.
Collier certainly knew that Native
American societies already had self-governing authority, as
See id. at 195.
See id. at 194, 195.
287 Id. at 194.
288 Id. at 195.
289 Id. at 196.
290 Id. at 197. This approach was embodied in a “draft-outline of a bill” contained in a
memorandum signed by both Siegel and Cohen one day after the Shepard memorandum. See
id.
285
286
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recognized by the courts, but the emphasis was on creating
new governments or cooperative organizations rather than
on supporting or strengthening existing governments.291
The initial congressional hearings on the draft bill exposed some
complicated and confusing aspects of the initial draft.292 At the
February 27, 1934, hearing, some congressmen expressed concern
as to whether Indians would make decisions in their best interests
considering the complex disposition of their land rights under the
bill and how to handle the consolidation of Indian communities in
areas in which whites had bought valuable tracts of land from
Indians and had made investments in that land.293
A
representative of the Crow Indians raised this latter concern, and
committee member Hubert H. Peavey made the following statement
of optimism that yields some examination concerning the perceived
purpose of the bill at the time:
Mr. Commissioner, it is true, that while the statement of Mr.
Yellow Tail to the committee shows many of the obstacles
and problems to be overcome in the settlement of these
various Indian situations under the terms of this bill, it also
presents a very hopeful phase of it in the fact that everything
that he has presented to this committee is what is typical of
the ordinary white community; and we are expecting and
trying by this bill to raise the Indian people up to the level of
the white communities in their affairs.294
Evidence of later congressional deliberations on an amended
version of the bill is evident in a 2014 memorandum to the
Secretary of the Interior addressing the meaning of “under federal
jurisdiction” under the Indian Reorganization Act.295 In this memo,
it is suggested that in a House committee hearing on May 17, 1934,
Collier proposed adding “under federal jurisdiction” after

Id. at 205.
See, e.g., Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearing on H.R. 7902 Before the H. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 73rd Cong. 126 (1934) [hereinafter Readjustment of Indian Affairs]; see also
THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT: CONGRESSES AND BILLS 20–23 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed., 2002)
(providing the complete text of the original proposed bill).
293 See, e.g., Readjustment of Indian Affairs, supra note 292, at 126, 127, 134, 136, 137,
138. During the hearing, Collier succinctly explains the basics of the new proposed land
ownership regime as follows: “In effect, the allotted Indian, whose land goes into the
community, keeps what he has got and gets the additional amount represented by his share
in the new land as a member.” Id. at 128.
294 Id. at 138.
295 See Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Off. of the Solicitor, to Sec’y of the Interior
on the Meaning of “Under Federal Jurisdiction” for Purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act
1 (Mar. 12, 2014), https://solicitor.doi.gov/opinions/M-37029.pdf.
291
292
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“recognized Indian tribe” in order to appease Senators Thomas and
Fraziers’ concerns regarding whether Indians such as the
Catawbas, who maintained tribal identity but “were not members of
tribes and were not enrolled, supervised, or living on a
reservation[,]” could be accounted for under the act.296
Much of the current discourse related to the Indian
Reorganization Act surrounds the 2009 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Carcieri v. Salazar.297 In that case, the Court decided
that the Secretary of the Interior would not accept land in trust
from an Indian tribe that was not recognized at the time the Indian
Reorganization Act was passed.298 The relevant provision in the
Indian Reorganization Act (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 479) allowed the
Secretary to accept trust land from any “recognized Indian tribe
now under [f]ederal jurisdiction.”299 The Court defined “now” as the
time in which the act was passed.300
In 2011, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held an
oversight hearing to discuss the contents and the implications of the
Carcieri decision.301 In his opening statement, Hawaiian U.S.
Senator Daniel K. Akaka stated that the Supreme Court was wrong
in Carcieri:
[A] Supreme Court decision in 2009 narrowly construed the
text of the [Indian Reorganization Act] and completely upended the status quo, which had existed for [seventy-five]
years, contrary to [c]ongressional intent, legislative history,
and affirmative actions by the Administration. I have a
great deal of respect for the Supreme Court and the hard
work that they do. However, when the [C]ourt gets it wrong,
it is the responsibility of Congress to fix it. That is why this
See id. at 10, 11.
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); see, e.g., Scott A. Taylor, Taxation in Indian
Country after Carcieri v. Salazar, 36 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 590, 591 (2010) (discussing the
potential tax implications of the decisions); see also Amanda D. Hettler, Note, Beyond a
Carcieri Fix: The Need for Broader Reform of the Land-into-Trust Process of the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1380 (2011) (discussing the inefficient
administration of the processes by which land can be taken into trust for Indians through
both pre-Carcieri and post-Carcieri administrative frameworks).
298 See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 395.
299 Id. at 382 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012) (“The term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall
include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now
under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who were,
on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall
further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.”)).
300 See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 395.
301 See The Indian Reorganization Act—75 Years Later: Renewing Our Commitment to
Restore Tribal Homelands and Promote Self-Determination: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2011).
296
297
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[c]ommittee at its first business meeting in the 112th
Congress passed a Carcieri fix out of [c]ommittee. My
Carcieri fix bill does nothing more than to simply restore the
status quo that existed for [seventy-five] years and affirms
the original intent of the Indian Reorganization Act to
restore tribal homelands and empower tribal governments to
exercise self-determination.302
Professor G. William Rice proposes a two-part fix to the Carcieri
decision:
The first section requires implementation of the original
intent of the [Indian Reorganization Act] in that lands
acquired by federally incorporated tribes would be
nontaxable Indian country when acquired within a
reservation or former reservation at the behest of the tribes.
In addition, the tribe, not the Secretary of the Interior, would
have management and operational control over said
properties subject only to the limited restrictions stated in
the statutory language or those set out in the applicable
charter with the consent of the tribe.303
Rice refers heavily to the UNDRIP in framing the proposed
Carcieri fix, particularly with regard to how Rice feels the term
“Indian” should be defined.304 Rice also purports “to achieve a basic
level of compliance with at least some of the standards set out in the
[d]raft [d]eclaration with respect to the rights of [i]ndigenous
peoples to land, territory, and resources” in his proposed fix.305
IX. CONCLUSION
A tribal FPIC law and protocol may serve as a self-determined
model to actualize indigenous rights as described in the UNDRP
302 Id. at 1–2; see also Rob Capriccioso, So Close! How the Senate Almost Passed a Clean
Carcieri Fix, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Sept. 19, 2013), http://indian
countrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/09/19/how-clean-carcieri-fix-almost-passed-senate151346 (providing an in-depth discussion of the congressional fate of Akaka’s proposed
Carcieri “fix”); Paul Moorehead, The ‘Carcieri’ Fix Bills Need to Do More, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (July 30, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com
/2014/07/30/carcieri-fix-bills-need-do-more (“Eighty years later, Indian tribes continue to
grapple with the same problems, only made worse by decades of further land fractionation
and a legal regime of Indian land management that has failed to adapt to changing
circumstances on the ground in tribal communities.”).
303 G. William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri “Fix”: Updating the Trust Land Acquisition
Process, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 594 (2009).
304 See generally id. at 598 (invoking Articles 9 and 33 of the UNDRIP).
305 Id. at 608 (referring to the draft declaration).
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regarding the development or use of culture, lands, territories, and
resources, and would serve to tribally implement concepts of the
UNDRIP, moving away from the outmoded domestic processes of
consultation and the Indian Reorganization Act.
Indigenous
peoples in the U.S. have a unique opportunity under Montana to
develop and implement their own FPIC protocol in order to assert
their human rights, and a model under United States law for Indian
tribes to assert their sovereign and human rights without waiting
for member state implementation may serve as a starting point for
indigenous peoples globally to actualize the same.

